Amid the ongoing fighting between pro-Syrian government tribal militias and local Druze factions in the primarily Druze province of al-Suwayda’ in southern Syria, it has become clear to me that misconceptions about the situation, promoted among media activists but also amplified by external analysts, have only exacerbated tensions and made the situation worse.
With regards to Israel, the Druze called for their help out of desperation since they see MoD forces as an existential threat to them, yet Syrians were more than happy to label them traitors for it while willingly turning a blind eye to Al-Sharaa's own secret dealings with Israel and talk of joining the Abraham accords. This speaks volumes to how quickly the Syrian social media sphere turns against minorities.
Very strong piece raising many important points and providing nuance - much appreciated. I have very much noticed the same split among external analysts that were pro-revolution: some are now a little too lenient towards the new government.
One thing I was surprised about was your assessment in point 3: I find it easy to see how at this moment in time, calling for an Israeli military intervention would be as perceived as inflammatory/ treacherous as separatism, if not more so.
I agree with everything you’ve argued, particularly and most importantly on the burden on the government to manage the situation, but would just challenge #3 a bit (as some others have done). It’s a less important point compared to the others and this might just be semantics at this point, but calling for international support essentially means calling on those international actors to violate the sovereignty of the state you’re a part of and prioritizing your own interests over that. The textbook definition of separatism is indeed slightly different, but I don’t know that one is better than the other and I don’t know any sovereign government who would allow it (unless the government itself gave mandate).
Seems fair. One question: Violations by government forces happened before or after some of them were ambushed and few of them executed after surrendering?
1. I’m not sure your qualification of the term separatism is very compelling — since the same argument could be made for virtually every separatist organisation throughout history. They did not initially explicitly desire to break away from the nation state or empire within which they resided, but initially sought to negotiate demands for autonomy through diplomacy and armed insurrection. Once this outcome was not secured, independence became entertained often with external support.
2. I think the post here doesn’t assign sufficient blame to the ambushing of GSS forces arriving in As-Suwayda to mitigate tensions between the Bedouins and Druze. IE, the ambushing which prompted (though does in no way excuse) the GSS in turn committing their own atrocities.
3. Overall, I don’t think contextualising the STG’s supposedly militaristic approach to the situation within their “jihadist” background makes much sense. If in any other country on the planet, a group of insurrectionists started an armed rebellion (to negotiate either autonomy OR independence) and called in a hostile invading power to bomb the country to enforce these demands, then the central government would pretty much go in guns blazing almost immediately and nobody would ever assign them the “Jihadist” label for doing so. The fact that there have been several months worth of back and forth diplomacy arguably demonstrates a desire to avoid what a typical modern nation state would do in response to something like this. Had this happened a few decades ago we would have almost certainly seen an immediate repeat of the Hama massacre.
Hijri has been nothing but a troublemaker. He doesn't need to explicitly advocate for secession for that to be his intention. You just have to read between the lines. He has repeatedly rejected every overture by the new government.
One participant in the fighting is the phantom Bedouin element. Some reports place their number in the tens of thousands and blame them for savagery, reckless disregard for finely balanced compromise, and secret complicity with the national army. Who are these Bedouin, whose ranks are said to be swollen by tribesmen from Syria's east as well as from Iraq. They are characterized as leaderless marauders. Who are their headmen and what are their goals? Are they really army auxiliaries and does the army provide at least a modicum of command and control?
Your voice is badly needed Aymenn
With regards to Israel, the Druze called for their help out of desperation since they see MoD forces as an existential threat to them, yet Syrians were more than happy to label them traitors for it while willingly turning a blind eye to Al-Sharaa's own secret dealings with Israel and talk of joining the Abraham accords. This speaks volumes to how quickly the Syrian social media sphere turns against minorities.
Very strong piece raising many important points and providing nuance - much appreciated. I have very much noticed the same split among external analysts that were pro-revolution: some are now a little too lenient towards the new government.
One thing I was surprised about was your assessment in point 3: I find it easy to see how at this moment in time, calling for an Israeli military intervention would be as perceived as inflammatory/ treacherous as separatism, if not more so.
I agree with everything you’ve argued, particularly and most importantly on the burden on the government to manage the situation, but would just challenge #3 a bit (as some others have done). It’s a less important point compared to the others and this might just be semantics at this point, but calling for international support essentially means calling on those international actors to violate the sovereignty of the state you’re a part of and prioritizing your own interests over that. The textbook definition of separatism is indeed slightly different, but I don’t know that one is better than the other and I don’t know any sovereign government who would allow it (unless the government itself gave mandate).
Seems fair. One question: Violations by government forces happened before or after some of them were ambushed and few of them executed after surrendering?
A few points:
1. I’m not sure your qualification of the term separatism is very compelling — since the same argument could be made for virtually every separatist organisation throughout history. They did not initially explicitly desire to break away from the nation state or empire within which they resided, but initially sought to negotiate demands for autonomy through diplomacy and armed insurrection. Once this outcome was not secured, independence became entertained often with external support.
2. I think the post here doesn’t assign sufficient blame to the ambushing of GSS forces arriving in As-Suwayda to mitigate tensions between the Bedouins and Druze. IE, the ambushing which prompted (though does in no way excuse) the GSS in turn committing their own atrocities.
3. Overall, I don’t think contextualising the STG’s supposedly militaristic approach to the situation within their “jihadist” background makes much sense. If in any other country on the planet, a group of insurrectionists started an armed rebellion (to negotiate either autonomy OR independence) and called in a hostile invading power to bomb the country to enforce these demands, then the central government would pretty much go in guns blazing almost immediately and nobody would ever assign them the “Jihadist” label for doing so. The fact that there have been several months worth of back and forth diplomacy arguably demonstrates a desire to avoid what a typical modern nation state would do in response to something like this. Had this happened a few decades ago we would have almost certainly seen an immediate repeat of the Hama massacre.
Hijri has been nothing but a troublemaker. He doesn't need to explicitly advocate for secession for that to be his intention. You just have to read between the lines. He has repeatedly rejected every overture by the new government.
One participant in the fighting is the phantom Bedouin element. Some reports place their number in the tens of thousands and blame them for savagery, reckless disregard for finely balanced compromise, and secret complicity with the national army. Who are these Bedouin, whose ranks are said to be swollen by tribesmen from Syria's east as well as from Iraq. They are characterized as leaderless marauders. Who are their headmen and what are their goals? Are they really army auxiliaries and does the army provide at least a modicum of command and control?
Aymenn, to what extent did Druze and others pay attention to Amb Barrack’s sharp rejection of federalism?