The Build-Up to the Northwest Syria Offensive: Collection of Some Historical Reports

As the insurgent offensive was initially underway in northwest Syria, an interviewee who had worked with the Iranian-backed formations in Syria and operated on the Aleppo frontlines with the insurgents mentioned to me that the attack itself was “expected” but not the size of it. I have to admit that when initially thinking about the situation, I was skeptical about anticipation of the insurgent offensive by the government forces and its allies. Looking back over the reports I have compiled here in translation as a historical resource, I think my assessment has been too skeptical with regards to the government side.

Put another way, it seems to me that there was some sense of caution against a possible insurgent offensive, but it is likely that the scale of any possible offensive was underestimated: that is, one can still speak of complacency on the part of the government and its allies. Perhaps this complacency was partly driven by the belief that the ceasefire arrangement in place since 2020 would ultimately hold. It may also have derived from overconfidence in the effectiveness of the defensive lines to protect Aleppo city, or not considering the capture of Aleppo city as a serious goal for the insurgents.

In the autumn, there was indeed some mobilisation by Syrian government forces and their allies as a precaution against a possible attack by insurgents, but whatever mobilisation and precautionary measures that were taken were clearly not sufficient to withstand the scale of the offensive by the time that it was eventually launched. It may be that the insurgents’ decision to launch the offensive was delayed until the Syrian government and its allies had somehow appeared to let down their guard as the rumours and talk of an offensive did not materialise over the course of October and the first half of November, thus luring them into a false sense of security towards the end of November. It may also be that the offensive was delayed to avoid giving the false impression of collusion with Israel, in that it might have been feared that launching the offensive while Israel was engaged in active hostilities with Hezbollah in Lebanon would have given ammunition to conspiracy theorists about collusion in an attack on the ‘resistance axis’ to serve Israel’s interests.

Sam Heller has suggested that an increase in aerial attacks on insurgent held areas reflected an attempt by the Syrian government and its allies to remind the insurgents of their overall command of the skies and warn them of severe consequences should they try any kind of attack. On this reading, it would be ironic that this apparent attempt to deter the insurgents through aerial attacks became the official pretext of the offensive that pushed into Aleppo city: ‘Deterring the Aggression.’ However, it is also apparent that aerial attacks had been going for some time, and while it is fair to speak of a more recent escalation in the autumn run-up to the offensive, some of the reporting suggests other motives at play over the longer-run for aerial attacks, such as punitive action for the insurgents’ drone attack on a Syrian military college in Homs last year. Thus, a desire to push back on aerial attacks- particularly suicide drones- can still be reckoned as a genuine motive for the insurgent offensive, though not the central one, which was to seize territory, including Aleppo city itself (rather than viewing the capture of Aleppo city as an outcome the insurgents might not have been aiming for).

In any event, we are witnessing an even more ferocious aerial campaign by the Syrian and Russian air forces than the aerial attacks prior to the offensive, as can be seen by the bombing of Aleppo city and other places. I would also caution against the view that Russia was somehow willing to allow the insurgent offensive in light of the reports. On the contrary, it becomes clear that Russia was engaging in some training exercises with the Syrian government forces as a precaution against a possible insurgent offensive.

Below is a collection of reports in chronological order with translated excerpts. I have highlighted excerpts of interest in bold and italics.

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al-Watan (Syrian government, 6 October)

Amid news of preparations by al-Nusra to launch an operation against it- the Syrian army is on high alert to repel the terrorist organisations on the first anniversary of the war college massacre.

Aleppo- Khalid Zanklo
Hama- Muhammad Ahmad Khabazi