Sunni-Alawite Tensions in Syria: Interview

Understandably, the fall of Assad’s regime has raised questions about the future of relations between the Sunni Arab and Alawite communities in Syria. Some analysts such as Lina Khatib, drawing on a generally conciliatory tone towards minorities struck by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s leadership as the regime collapsed, have suggested that it is now time to move beyond “Sunni vs Alawite” as a binary for understanding Syria’s transitional phase.

I have to say that whatever one’s personal sentiments about Assad’s downfall, such a suggestion is far too premature. It certainly seems true that once Assad’s regime finally collapsed, people across different sects and ethnicities in Syria felt relieved to be finally rid of Assad and the repressive regime, but that does not mean that sect-coded animosity has simply died out overnight. The fact is that the Assad regime was perceived by many Sunni Arabs in the country as embodying an Alawite-dominated regime oppressing the Sunni Arab majority, and the duration of the war, sectarian rhetoric on both sides and war crimes have contributed to an inflaming of tensions since 2011. Of course this does not mean simplistically seeing developments in the country solely in terms of Sunnis vs. Alawites, but it would be naive to imagine that resentment and tension have vanished, especially among individuals over whom the insurgent leadership does not exercise full control.

For example, below is what one contact- an insurgent originating from the coastal region of Syria where there is a large Alawite population- posted recently:

"Between us [Sunnis] and them [Alawites] are mountains of corpses and rivers of hatred, and blood, blood, blood and wailing and long revenge. To the descendants of apes [i.e. Alawites].”

Although ‘descendants of apes’ is also a sectarian insult employed against Jews, but it has been used against Alawites as well. Most recently, reports have now emerged of unrest flaring among Alawite communities on the coastal region and in Homs. To get a sense of sentiment among at least some Alawites about what is currently going on, I decided to interview a friend who has been a guest post contributor to this site. This friend, who once led an Iranian-backed formation called ‘al-Ghalibun’ but had come to recognise some time before Assad’s downfall that he was essentially the root of the problems in Syria and was thus happy to see him gone, is himself an Alawite and a resident of Latakia. While he has no desire to see Assad or his regime return, he is concerned about the future of Sunni-Alawite relations in the country under a leadership dominated by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, whose own break from al-Qa‘ida he is skeptical of (I personally am not skeptical of the breaking of ties, but it should be recognised that the matter may be harder to explain to some people inside Syria).

In my view, it would not be wise to dismiss the concerns here as simply the work of Iranian agitation, propaganda by the ‘resistance axis’, or sabotage by ‘regime remnants,’ even if not all or most Alawites share the concerns to be outlined here. The perceptions outlined here are real and need to be taken seriously by those concerned for Syria’s future and not driven by an agenda of simply attacking the new government.

For comparison as a cautionary tale against blaming incidents on Iran and pro-Assad remnants, it was claimed in pro-opposition media that the burning of a Christmas tree in the Christian town of al-Suqaylabiya in Hama was the work of pro-Assad saboteurs: in fact, it was foreign jihadists who committed the act.

Below is the interview I conducted with my friend.

Q: What has aroused the [Alawite] people’s anger?