Amid the intensification of the conflict between Israel and the broader ‘axis of resistance’, particularly on the Lebanon front, there is naturally much talk of the prospect of ‘victory’ on both sides. It is also the case that the concept of victory risks becoming poorly defined or over-expanded. On the Israeli side, it is fair to question whether the war goals in Lebanon have become muddled and unduly expanded from a more limited and clear aim of deterring Hezbollah strikes on Israel and forcing the group to decouple its demands for ceasefire from the Gaza front, to a far greater goal of essentially destroying Hezbollah. This goal of destroying Hezbollah appeared to be the messaging conveyed by Netanyahu’s speech on Lebanon. On a more popular level, overreach is arguably reflected in discourse about ‘liberating’ Lebanon and potentially ‘remaking the Middle East’ through the Lebanon campaign.
But it is also fair to question the nature of ‘victory’ on the axis of resistance side. That the short-term goal is to get Israel to agree to a ceasefire in Gaza is clear, and there is no doubt that if Israel were to make such a concession, it could be spun as a ‘victory’ in the propaganda of Hamas and its allies. But then what? How would the long-term goal of trying to eliminate Israel be advanced and realised? While Hamas leader Ghazi Hamad boasted shortly after the 7 October assault that Hamas would seek to conduct similar attacks again and again in the goal of removing Israel, the fact is that a repetition of that assault is extremely unlikely.
The 7 October assault has surely been a ‘vaccination moment’ for Israel in the way that the 9/11 attacks were for the United States, or the Islamic State offensive in 2014 that seized large swaths of territory spanning the borders of Iraq and Syria. The evidence suggests foremost that the success of 7 October assault was ultimately a matter of Israeli intelligence failure and complacency, stemming from a belief that Hamas had generally been ‘contained’ and that the need to focus efforts on the threat stemming from Hezbollah. Even with a ceasefire agreed in Gaza, Israel would surely be much more stringent in monitoring what comes into and goes on in Gaza, keeping an eye out for and pre-empting any threats posed by Hamas and other militant groups.
The following guest post was written by the person who served as leader of a (now defunct) Iranian-backed formation in Syria called “al-Ghalibun” (“Those who overcome”- see the profile I wrote here). The author questions the concepts of ‘victory’ among Arabs more generally, particularly in relation to the ongoing fight between Israel and Hezbollah.