The Escalation in Islamic State Operations Against the Syrian Democratic Forces

In queries I have received over the years, I have often been asked if an Islamic State attack or set of attacks over a short-time span in Iraq and/or Syria constituted a ‘resurgence’ for the group. In general, I do not believe that this sort of framing is the right word, because then the following question arises: what exactly does ‘resurgence’ mean? Does it mean a revival on the path towards recreating the peak of the group’s fortunes in the 2014-2015 period when it seized and controlled substantial amounts of territory spanning the Iraq and Syria borders? This is of course ultimately how the Islamic State frames its general insurgent strategy: namely, that through persistence in waging jihad, it can gradually wear down its enemies to the point of inducing a rapid collapse and swift conquest, similar to what happened with the takeover of Mosul and other areas in Iraq and Syria in the summer of 2014.

Yet few would argue that the Islamic State is close to realising such a goal. Rather than speaking of ‘resurgence’, it is more useful to ask for a given period in Iraq and/or Syria: has there been an escalation in the scale of the Islamic State’s insurgent activities? In the case of Syria, in the recent period (in particular since the beginning of this year), there is good evidence for an escalation in the Islamic State’s insurgent activities, in the areas spanning those controlled by the Syrian government and the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in central, eastern and northeastern Syria, as will be explained below.