The Battle of al-Nabi Yunis Summit in Latakia in 2012

By now, many of the early battles of the Syrian civil war are a distant memory at best for most observers. They are nonetheless worth revisiting to examine how the insurgency developed and tried to conduct military operations in the early stages. One interesting case has recently been written about by the Telegram channel “Archive of the Battles and Martyrs of the Syrian Sahel” (which also penned the interesting account of the “A’isha Umm al-Mu’mineen” battle in Latakia in 2013). The battle covered here is one in which insurgents attempted to take over al-Nabi Yunis Summit in October 2012. The idea was that gaining control of this summit would grant the insurgents a strategic vantage point that would allow them to take control of other areas. Not all the insurgents in the Sahel (coastal) area agreed on waging this battle however, and argued instead for a battle to take the coastal town of Kassab. As a result, some foreign fighter groups did not participate in this battle for al-Nabi Yunis Summit.

This battle ended in disaster for the insurgents after less than a day, as the insurgents were forced to withdraw, and one group of those participating appears to have been wiped out and taken prisoner by the Syrian army. The failure of the battle is attributed to poor coordination and inadequate preparation.

At this early stage, it is interesting to observe (as Aron Lund also did in examining the account of the A’isha Umm al-Mu’mineen battle) the micro-militia dynamics at play here. The battle had around 300 fighters distributed over at least 15 factions, amounting to an average of 20 fighters per faction. Today of course, there are far fewer factions than in 2012, but it is fair to say that the early insurgency in Syria presented a rather chaotic picture.

Below is the account translated by me in full.

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

The Battle of al-Nabi Yunis Summit in Jabal al-Akrad
13 October 2012

Archive of the Battles and Martyrs of the Syrian Sahel

Prepared by Abu Ibrahim al-Shami

The participating battalions:

Katibat al-Izz bin Abd al-Salam
Katibat al-Tawheed
Katibat al-Shaheed Mustafa Mirza
Katibat al-Wa’ad al-Sadiq
Katibat Rijal al-Sahel
Katibat al-Mughira bin Shu’aba
Katibat Fursan al-Izz
Katibat al-Sultan Muhammad al-Fatih
Katibat al-Zhahir Baibars
Katibat Omar al-Mukhtar
Katibat al-Bara’ bin Malik
Katibat Ansar al-Medina
Katibat al-Maham al-Khasa

And other battalions of Jabal al-Akrad

The general amir for the battle: Abu Baseer al-Hamami
The number of mujahideen: around 300 mujahideen
Targeted points: al-Nabi Yunis Summit
Number of martyrs: around 40 martyrs
Weapons used: light weapons, locally-made mortars, and medium machine-guns.

The importance of al-Nabi Yunis Summit: the importance of al-Nabi Yunis Summit is distinguished in the fact that it is the highest summit in Latakia countryside and its elevation is more than 1200 m above seal level. It lies on the administrative borders between the city of Latakia to the west and the city of Hama. The summit overlooks Latakia countryside in Jabal al-Akrad and Jabal al-Turkoman, and even the Turkish borders. It also overlooks Idlib countryside like Jisir al-Shughur and other places. The summit also overlooks Hama countryside as the Sahl al-Ghab is located directly under the summit. The summit is distinguished by its cold climate and rough, rocky mountainous topography. The summit is 18 km away from the Nusayri city of al-Qardaha. It is also less than 20 km away from the al-Idha’at summit in al-Slenfeh.

Before the battle:

A little before the battle of Burj al-Qasab, the first operations room in Sahel was formed, known as the “Mujahideen Operations Room,” which included many of the battalions of Jabal al-Akrad and Jabal al-Turkoman. A short time after the liberation of Burj al-Qasab, the Mujahideen Operations Room was divided into two. The first group believed in opening the battle of al-Nabi Yunis Summit in Jabal al-Akrad as it is a strategic tower [burj] with high elevation and overlooking many regions of Latakia countryside, Hama countryside and even Idlib countryside. The fall of the tower into the hands of the mujahideen would mean their control over many areas underneath it.

The second group believed in opening the battle of the touristic town of Kassab because it is a big touristic town on the border with Turkey and has an opening to the sea, and in it were many war spoils that would invigorate the mujahideen in the Sahel. In addition, the army had not fortified it well, so its conquest would be easy and the regime would be very much impacted by its fall since it is among the well-known towns, and would turn public opinion against it.

The reason for the delay of the battle:

The battle of al-Nabi Yunis Summit was delayed twice. The first delay was at the battle of Burj al-Qasab as the battle was originally on al-Nabi Yunis Summit, then the axis changed to Burj al-Qasan. On the second occasion the delay was due to the fact that some of the battalions were afraid of the battle of al-Nabi Yunis because of the area’s topography and the army’s fortification.

Then it was decided to start the battle of al-Nabi Yunis Summit.

Reconnaissance for the battle:

The reconnaissance of al-Nabi Yunis Summit lasted two weeks only via the operations room, which included a number of the battalions. The room assigned individuals to conduct the mission of reconnaissance.

Bringing together and marching:

The bringing together of the mujahideen was in two groups. One group in Selma city, the other group was in the village of Markashila and the village of al-Jubb al-Ahmar in Jabal al-Akrad.

As for the muhajireen represented in the Libyan Katibat al-Muhajireen and Katibat Suqur al-Izz, they did not participate in the battle because the operations room that was formed for the battle of al-Nabi Yunis was due to the division in the first operations room.

As for Kata’ib Ansar al-Sham that was the strike force in the Sahel, it did not participate in the battle also because of preparing for the battle of Kassab.

Contingents of the battle:

First contingent: to assault al-Nabi Yunis Summit.

Second contingent: it was placed behind the army’s lands and was the most dangerous group and the most distant one in terms of marching. The mujahideen suffered the greatest slaughter in this group. Its job was to cut the Slenfeh-Sahl al-Ghab route reaching the summit.

Third contingent: to cut the route from Jabal Sahyun to al-Nabi Yunis Summit.

Fourth contingent: intended to cut the general route reaching the tower from Jar al-Qamar route.

The march and beginning of the battle:

The march began by night and continued for more than 6 hours, and when daylight appeared, the contingents had reached their places, and the clashing began with clearing the path through use of local mortars and medium machine guns (14.5 mm) and Doushka machine guns.

The first hours of the clashing passed as hoped for, and the mujahideen began achieving an advance towards the summit, while the contingents for the connection of the routes were waiting for their prey in order to hunt them. Matters remained as such until noon, when the frenzied bombing on the mujahideen’s positions began. Amid the weakness of wireless coordination between the contingents and the military weakness because of lack of expertise and the frenzied bombing, this was a cause for the haphazard withdrawal that brought about great slaughter on the mujahideen.

So it seems that the battle was greater than the military assessments that had been put in place.

The haphazard withdrawal and the killing of the mujahideen:

At noon, the haphazard withdrawal from the battle began, so the contingents began withdrawing without reforming the rest of the contingents because of the weakness of communication, so each group believed that the group next to it had withdrawn. This caused chaos during the withdrawal, in the wake of which a number of the mujahideen were killed. Among them was the official for laying mines in the battle of Burj al-Qasab Abu Omar Kaykhiya (may God accept him) and his body and the bodies of dozens remained on the summit.

The army’s isolation and encirclement of the second contingent located behind the army’s lines:

After the contingents withdrew from the battle, only the contingent was connecting the Sahl al-Ghab and Slenfeh route with the summit. It was located far behind enemy lines. The army descended upon this contingent and besieged it in a narrow area, and brought about slaughter upon them. One of the eye witnesses has related that the army had besieged a contingent in one of the caves and was still firing firing grenades and bullets at them, until they were all killed. In that incident alone more than 30 mujahideen were killed. The bodies of most of them were taken by the army. Likewise it took eight of them prisoner, and God is the One Whose help is to be sought.

The report that Abu Baseer Hamai prevented the battalions from aiding him:

That report became widespread in the mountains of the Sahel, claiming that Abu Baseer the leader of the battle had put in place a checkpoint and prevented people from helping him, so that he could gain the monopoly of the battle’s war spoils. This is untrue.

But because of the fact that some of the contingents withdrew and Abu Baseer’s contingent remained without withdrawing, that report spread about. But Abu Baseer made a mistake as he did not withdraw with the withdrawal of the rest of the contingents, which caused a slaughter among his youth.

Reasons for the battle’s failure:

Among the most important reasons for the battle’s lack of success is the weak coordination between the contingents, for the coordination was virtually lacking. This cause the loss of some of the contingents in the forests. Coordination is the nerve centre of the battle.

In addition, the military expertise was generally weak, and the battle was greater than they expected, and needed more military and Shari’i preparation than they put in place for it. It was necessary for battle reconnaissance to be performed for more than two weeks, and the coordination had to be greater than it actually was. Even the second battle of al-Nabi Yunis in the fourth month of 2013 had the same problem in terms of reasons for its lack of success: weak coordination and little preparation.

Finally:

Among the results of opening up the Sahel front in a general sense was not allowing the mujahideen to seize the summit because that would grant them the opportunity to bomb the regime’s positions in al-Qardaha in Latakia countryside, for it is only 18 km away: i.e. Grad rockets with a range of 20 km could reach it, and these rockets were in the possession of the mujahideen.