Internal Divisions Within the Alawite Insurgency in Syria

Statement, Translation and Analysis

Of the various trends of skepticism and opposition to the new government among Syria’s minority communities, the Alawite insurgency has so far proven the least successful. It has not managed to secure any meaningful concessions or gains for the community whose interests it claims to uphold. Further, while security incidents occasionally take place on the coastal region, there is no imminent risk of an Alawite insurgent takeover of the coastal region, a coup against the government or even necessarily a repeat of a major coordinated insurgent action that preceded the coastal massacres in March 2025.

A major part of the issue is that the insurgency does not have a foreign patron that actively intervenes on its behalf inside Syria. By contrast, American diplomatic mediation for the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has helped secure at least some concessions in terms of government appointments for SDF figures, such as leading SDF commander Sipan Hamo being appointed deputy defence minister for Syria’s eastern region. Likewise, active Israeli military intervention for the Druze in al-Suwayda’ has allowed (for the time being) Druze factions aligned with Hikmat al-Hijri and united under the ‘National Guard’ initiative to retain security control over parts of al-Suwayda’ province.

But it is also clear that the Alawite insurgency is marked by internal divisions and has not produced a unified coalition analogous to the ‘National Guard’ coalition of Druze factions, even if many of the insurgents proclaim support for Alawite cleric Ghazal Ghazal.