Aymenn’s Monstrous Publications: Syria

The Rise and Fall of Mihrac Ural/Ali Kayali

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Sat, 17 Oct 2026 19:47:38 GMT

Recently, the Syrian government announced the arrest of Mihrac Ural/Ali Kayali, a Turkish-born Alawite who led the ‘Syrian Resistance’, also called the ‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Sanjak of Alexandretta.’ While fighting in support of the Assad regime, his militia also claimed to be working to restore the Hatay region of southern Turkey to Syrian control. In this post I will detail his rise and fall and share some experiences of my interactions with him, and assess what his arrest symbolises and the overall role of his group during the war.

Announcement by Syrian state channel al-Ikhbariah about Ural being in state custody. The photo is definitely of Ural.

Fake News and An Armed Sectarian Mob: A Recent Case in North Aleppo

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Mon, 12 Oct 2026 14:11:02 GMT

Observers and analysts of Syria- particularly those who are supportive of the government- have repeatedly warned about ‘disinformation’ of a sectarian nature being put out by anti-government actors, such as exaggerations and fabrications about reported violations against members of minority communities. While there is some truth to what they say, the reality is that ‘fake news’ of a sectarian import is also put out and circulated among Sunni constituencies supportive of the government and has real world consequences for members of minority communities, as a recent case from north Aleppo countryside demonstrates.

State Electricity and Water in the Syrian Shia Villages of Nubl and al-Zahara’

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Sat, 03 Oct 2026 19:15:57 GMT

While the Twelver Shia villages of Nubl and al-Zahara’ in Aleppo province generally have a good internal security situation owing to the security forces placing checkpoints at the entrance to these villages on the Aleppo-Gaziantep highway and the confiscation of weapons inside the villages, the public services situation with regards to electricity and water remains poor. One of these problems predates the fall of the Assad regime, whereas the other reflects a more recent development. Both issues are intertwined.

Syrian Muslim Brotherhood Shura Council Statement

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Thu, 01 Oct 2026 21:32:26 GMT

The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria was the leading face of the insurgency against the Assad regime in the 1970s and 1980s, but during the war that eventually brought down the regime it never proved to be the leading face of the insurgency, though there were some groups that were seen in particular as linked to the Brotherhood in Syria (e.g. Faylaq al-Sham) or had Brotherhood elements in them. Instead, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, which was foundationally a Salafi group, spearheaded the overthrow of the regime.

The Memorial for the Massacre in the Alawite Village of al-Sanobar

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Fri, 25 Sep 2026 10:12:50 GMT

Whereas in the previous post I discussed a visit to a local shrine in the Alawite village of al-Sanobar that lies on the route between Latakia city and Jableh and aspects of present normality of life and security there that might contradict assumptions of a ‘genocide’ of Alawites in Syria, in this post I want to focus on the darker side of al-Sanobar’s more recent history: namely, the massacre that took place in the village in March 2025, committed by pro-government forces.

Alawite Shrines of Syria: The Shrine of Shaykh Ali in al-Sanobar

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Sun, 20 Sep 2026 12:38:48 GMT

On social media, one sometimes sees claims that Alawites in Syria are being subject to a ‘genocide.’ Points cited in support of this claim include massacres of Alawites that took place in March 2025, instances of vandalisation of Alawite shrines, instances of seizure of Alawite farmlands by Sunnis, instances of killings of Alawites in the Homs area (often framed as revenge attacks on people associated with the former regime), and instances of Alawite women being kidnapped.

None of the facts behind this claim should be denied or whitewashed. All of these things have taken place, and it is unsurprising that a number of Alawites have decided to flee Syria and take refuge in Lebanon. But it would be wrong to overgeneralise and conclude that a genocide is taking place. Reliance on news coming out on social media can give a distorted The reality is that variations and contrasts exist by locality and sometimes within the same locality. This became apparent for me during a recent visit to the village of al-Sanobar (‘Pine’) in Latakia province, lying on the route between Latakia city and Jableh.

A New Joint Statement from French and Uzbek ‘Muhajirin’ in Syria

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Mon, 14 Sep 2026 09:30:46 GMT

Among the various contingents of ‘muhajirin’ (foreigners who came to the insurgent-held areas of Syria during the war against the Assad regime), a clear alliance has emerged between a contingent of Idlib-based Uzbeks who are skeptical and critical of the current Syrian government and a contingent of French under Omar Omsen who are based in north Idlib and have issues not only with the current government but also the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham-led order in northwest Syria that preceded it.

Recently, Abd al-Razzaq al-Mahdi- a Syrian Salafi cleric who has himself been critical of what he sees as excessive inclination towards secularism on the part of the government as well as continued practices of arbitrary arrest- suggested that ‘muhajirin’ in general should either merge into government institutions, focus on da‘wa (religious outreach efforts) or simply engage in business. In response, both contingents have issued a joint statement.

Interview with a Rijal al-Karama Affiliate in al-Suwayda’

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Thu, 10 Sep 2026 12:29:15 GMT

In a recent post on X, U.S. envoy to Syria Tom Barrack spoke of American dismay about a ‘renewed escalation’ in the primarily Druze province of al-Suwayda’ in southern Syria, where security control remains split between Syrian government forces on the peripheries (mainly the northern and western countrysides) and local armed Druze groups, nominally united under the ‘National Guard’ endorsed by Suwayda’ Druze spiritual leader Hikmat al-Hijri.

For their part, pro-‘National Guard’ sources such as ‘Jethro Press’ have asserted that the government has tightened a siege on Suwayda’ in a bid to try to force the Druze population to submit. At the same time, some internal controversy has emerged over the effective deportation of a local critic of Hijri: Atef Hunaydi of the village of Majdal, who has since been made to relocate to Damascus.

While not all the Druze armed groups are wholly united in terms of endorsing Hijri’s notion of ‘Mount Bashan’ and the idea of complete separation from Syria and/or annexation by Israel, a rejectionist stance towards the Damascus government continues to predominate among them.

To discuss these issues and more, below is an interview conducted on 6 September with a media activist for Bayraq Saba' al-Jabal, an affiliate of the Rijal al-Karama Movement that was founded during the war by Wahid al-Bal‘ous (a Druze shaykh), who was assassinated in 2015 (likely by the Assad regime). Rijal al-Karama still asserts that it follows Wahid’s path, though his two sons Fahad and Layth are aligned with Damascus, with the latter currently serving as a member of the new Syrian parliament.

Q: Recently the 11th anniversary of the martyrdom of Shaykh Wahid al-Bal‘ous has passed. Of course the Rijal al-Karama Movement says it is still on his path, and in al-Suwayda’ today many people speak about the Mount Bashan project and separation from Syria. Do you think there is an inconsistency between Wahid al-Bal‘ous’ path and support for the Mount Bashan project today?

Syrian Turkmen Activist Complaints on Teaching of Turkish in Syrian Schools

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Mon, 07 Sep 2026 21:11:41 GMT

The question of instruction in the Kurdish language for Kurdish school-children has been a key issue as part of the integration of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian state. The end result of that integration process has been some concessions for limited instruction in Kurdish with Arabic remaining the dominant language of instruction even in Kurdish-majority areas.

But Kurds are not the only ethnic minority concerned about linguistic and cultural rights. Activist members of the Turkmen minority- primarily found in Latakia, Tartous, Aleppo (especially its northern countryside) and Homs provinces- have been keen to secure at least some instruction in the Turkish language.

The National Guard and Exams for Students in Suwayda’

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Wed, 02 Sep 2026 14:25:53 GMT

NB: Owing to family issues with the birth of a baby, I will not be posting as much as I normally do this month. A discount paid subscription rate remains this month. Alternatively, a donation of $50 or more to support paying licensing fees related to my next academic book project (payable here) will grant the donor a complementary annual subscription to this newsletter.

While local Druze armed groups under the ‘National Guard’ rubric retain security control of much of the predominantly Druze province of al-Suwayda’ in southern Syria, the government in Damascus still has leverage over the province because there is no formal international recognition of any purported autonomous structures backed by the National Guard. Thus, if students in al-Suwayda’ wish to attain accredited educational qualifications, they must go through the institutions that are controlled by Damascus.

One recent note of controversy on education has been the question of student exams. The central government recently invited students in al-Suwayda’ to take their exams in areas controlled by the government in the northern and western countryside of the province, where many originally Druze villages have become depopulated and were subject to destruction and looting by government forces during the July massacres in 2025. The National Guard, however, rejects the idea of allowing students to go to those exam centres, asserting that the government could not be trusted to provide safety and security for the students and accusing the government of using the exams issue as a form of pressure against the people of al-Suwayda’.

Amid the ongoing difficult living situation in the Druze areas of al-Suwayda’, reports that the National Guard prevented students from going to take their exams in government-controlled areas were not without controversy, although the National Guard itself portrayed the matter as widespread popular rejection of the government’s tactics and denied being the obstacle to the students’ movement. There has also been some wider controversy about recently broadcasted remarks of Suwayda’ Druze spiritual leader Hikmat al-Hijri (who endorses the National Guard project) portraying the Druze as an ‘indivisible’ part of Israel and sharing ‘creed’ with Israel.

To discuss some of these issues, below is a recent interview conducted on 29 August with a resident of Suwayda’.

According to a report today from the pro-Damascus ‘Suwayda 24’ outlet (which used to be fiercely critical of the government but has since been taken over by someone on the original admin team who is pro-government), ten students managed to go from National Guard-controlled areas to government-held areas to take their examinations.

Syrian Education Ministry Decree on Teaching Kurdish in Schools

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Mon, 31 Aug 2026 10:16:11 GMT

As part of the process of integrating the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and its Autonomous Administration (now officially declared ‘dissolved’) into the Syrian state, a key issue has been the question of Kurdish linguistic and cultural rights, including the right for Kurdish children to receive instruction in the Kurdish language. It is in this light that a new decree has been issued by the Education Ministry giving more specific instructions on the incorporation of Kurdish into the curricula. So what should one make of this decree?

New Ancient Tomb Found in Afrin

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Tue, 25 Aug 2026 22:47:00 GMT

As I will show in subsequent blog posts, Aleppo province’s Afrin area- whose original inhabitants are primarily Kurds and have returned in significant numbers since the fall of the Assad regime thanks to efforts for their return organised by the new Syrian government- is full of Byzantine/Roman ruins, and despite looting in previous years, there are still archaeological treasures waiting to be found. Among the most recent finds is an impressive funerary monument uncovered in the Bulbul district of Afrin, and fortunately it has been transferred to the National Museum in Aleppo city.

In response to a query by Alexander McKeever, the funerary inscription is not written in Latin but Ancient Greek, contrary to what Syrian news outlet Zaman al-Wasl reported. I provide a transcription of the funerary inscription with my own translation below, since I have seen that there have been some erroneous attempts to transcribe and translate the funerary inscription on local social media. Note that the iota subscripts are my own insertion since they were not represented in Ancient Greek inscriptions at this point. Similarly the separation of words, the breathings on vowels and select capitalisation are my own editing, since the inscription is written in capital letters and there are no spaces between words.

The Situation in al-Suwayda’: Interview with a Pro-Government Druze Activist

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Sun, 23 Aug 2026 15:42:56 GMT

In contrast with the integration of at least parts of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces into the Syrian state, the situation in the primarily Druze province of al-Suwayda’ in the south of the country remains at an impasse with the province’s territory divided between the control of government forces and areas controlled by local armed Druze groups that align with Druze spiritual leader Hikmat al-Hijri or at least outwardly reject the government in Damascus.

For their part, the government and government supporters have cultivated and promoted some Druze figures from al-Suwayda’ who align with the government and vocally oppose al-Hijri’s views but do not reside in the province. The two most familiar figures in this regard are Layth al-Balous (now a member of the new Syrian parliament) and Sulayman ‘Abd al-Baqi (the government-appointed head of ‘internal security’), but there are a few others like the political activist Raid Sadek, who spent some time in Europe before returning to Syria. Recently, it was reported that Raid had been subject to physical attacks and an assassination attempt in the Druze-populated Damascus suburb of Jaramana.

Below is an interview I recently conducted with Raid regarding the situation in al-Suwayda’ and the impasse between the government and much of the local Druze population there, and what he sees as the solution.

Q: The UN says that dialogue on al-Suwayda’ and resolving its issues has reached a dead-end. In your view what are the most important reasons for that?