<![CDATA[Aymenn’s Monstrous Publications]]>https://www.aymennaltamimi.comhttps://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!EUQC!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0db81898-a5c2-46d0-b701-53ab616f628c_721x721.pngAymenn’s Monstrous Publicationshttps://www.aymennaltamimi.comSubstackWed, 29 Apr 2026 14:44:23 GMT<![CDATA[The Ruined Kurdish Village of Cilbirê in the Afrin Region]]>https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/the-ruined-kurdish-village-of-cilbirehttps://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/the-ruined-kurdish-village-of-cilbireMon, 27 Apr 2026 16:25:32 GMTIn a previous detailed report I did on the Afrin region, I noted that one could observe a genuine trend of the original Kurdish inhabitants returning to Afrin after large-scale displacement and extensive property rights violations committed in 2018 during Operation ‘Olive Branch’ when the Turkish military and Turkish-backed Syrian rebel groups dislodged the Kurdish-led ‘Syrian Democratic Forces’ from the region. Further, in general, both in Afrin and the wider north Aleppo region, Turkish influence over local administration has reduced as the new central Syrian state has established and consolidated institutions.

However, there are some caveats to this general assessment.

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]]><![CDATA[The Druze Village of Hadr in Qunaytra Province and the Israeli Presence: Interview with a Local]]>https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/the-druze-village-of-hadr-in-qunaytrahttps://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/the-druze-village-of-hadr-in-qunaytraThu, 23 Apr 2026 17:29:07 GMTYesterday, a video emerged of some Israeli settler activists who seek to colonise ‘Bashan’ (i.e. southern Syria) and had reportedly crossed into the area of Hadr- a Druze locality in Qunaytra province that lies opposite the Druze town of Majdal Shams in the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights. In keeping with their prior policy of evicting these would-be-settlers, Israeli forces that have moved into Syrian territory beyond the Golan since the fall of the Assad regime subsequently removed them.

How do locals in Hadr view these reported attempts at settlement and the Israeli presence in their area more generally? Their own stance on Israel is somewhat more complicated than that of Druze in al-Suwayda’ who are behind Hikmat al-Hijri and the notion of an Israeli-backed ‘Bashan Mountain’ autonomy/independence project. After all, for a number of years during the war (2012-2018), Hadr- as a regime-controlled locality- came into conflict with insurgents operating out of neighbouring localities, with some of those insurgents receiving Israeli backing.

Below is an interview conducted today with a resident of Hadr. He lost his daughter because of insurgent shelling of Hadr during the war and his brother- a member of Hezbollah- was assassinated by Israel in 2019. He offers a useful clarification on what actually happened with the would-be-settlers and the complexities behind Israel’s relations with the Druze of Hadr. The interview is edited and condensed for clarity and parenthetical insertions in square brackets are my own.

Screenshot from the video clip of would-be-settlers who crossed the border.

Q: What happened yesterday with the reported entry of Israeli settlers into Hadr?

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]]><![CDATA[Lebanon, Hezbollah and Negotiations with Israel: Interview with Bassam Ghanum]]>https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/lebanon-hezbollah-and-negotiationshttps://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/lebanon-hezbollah-and-negotiationsWed, 22 Apr 2026 14:59:37 GMTA ceasefire is now officially in place between Lebanon and Israel, and a second round of direct talks is reportedly due to take place between the two countries in Washington tomorrow. The U.S. mediation is likely motivated by a desire to secure an agreement- separate from the American negotiations track with Iran- that will normalise relations between Israel and Lebanon. Undoubtedly there are some in Lebanon (probably a small minority) who would welcome such developments alongside the final disarmament of Hezbollah, but others take a more nuanced view in which they see negotiations with Israel not as a track towards normalisation but rather a bitter necessity to spare Lebanon further destruction, just as they deem Hezbollah’s disarmament a necessity, not as an act of surrender to Israel but to give Lebanon a chance at stability.

The following interview below was conducted yesterday with Bassam Ghanum, a writer and political analyst for the site al-Aman that is linked to Lebanon’s Islamic Group (the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood), though I emphasise that Ghanum is speaking to me in his own capacity and whatever views he expresses here do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Islamic Group.

It is notable, however, that whereas the Islamic Group’s armed wing- Quwat al-Fajr- was a participant in the south Lebanon ‘support front’ for Gaza as a junior partner of Hezbollah in 2023-2024, it does not appear to have participated in the fighting this time between Hezbollah and Israel. This is so despite the praise that the Islamic Group’s southern branch recently offered for the ‘resistance’ and its ‘legendary steadfastness’ while calling for a ‘national defence strategy’ that combines the role of the ‘resistance forces in the field’ with the ‘role of state institutions.’

Below is the interview with Bassam.

Bassam Ghanum


Q: How do you assess the war that took place between Hezbollah and Israel recently? What did you think of Hezbollah’s opening of a support front for Iran against Israel? Did the war result in big losses for Hezbollah? Now the Israelis are occupying a number of villages in south Lebanon: is Lebanon compelled to negotiate with Israel as we now see in Washington?

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]]><![CDATA[A View from the Golan: Interview with 'NonZionism']]>https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/a-view-from-the-golan-interview-withhttps://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/a-view-from-the-golan-interview-withFri, 17 Apr 2026 19:06:24 GMTThroughout the U.S. and Israeli war against Iran and its ‘resistance axis’ allies, I have covered perspectives from Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. In contrast, the interviewee for this post is a resident of the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights and the author of a very interesting Substack/blog entitled ‘NonZionism’, written from an Israeli Jewish perspective that is neither typical hasbara nor the disillusioned ramblings of a far-left ex-Zionist-turned-‘anti-imperialist’.

In this interview, which makes for an interesting cross-border dialogue between someone in Syria and someone in Israel, we discuss the author’s own intellectual trajectory, how he views Israel’s future and the state of political discourse in the country today, and how life in the Golan Heights has been affected by the war.

This interview was conducted on 14 April and is slightly edited for clarity.

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A photo from the Golan Heights that I took a long time ago

Q: To begin with, could you explain a little about your personal story? Where you are from, your religious background, how you ended up in the Golan Heights?

A: I was born into what in Israel would be called a ‘traditional’ family in the UK, meaning not strictly religious in the sense of following Jewish law (halacha), but practicing orthodox Judaism to the extent that we practiced Judaism. This is relatively common in the UK, as opposed to the United States where the default form of Jewish identity is non-orthodox. At university, I became Modern Orthodox, and then after that I became Ultra-Orthodox. This roughly corresponded with moving from tepid Zionism, to less tepid Zionism to anti-Zionism. Then, after living in an Ultra-Orthodox community in London for six years, I became convinced of the truth of a radical version of Religious Zionism, which you call Kahanist for short, and I moved with my wife and then one son to Israel. We lived in Jerusalem for six years, and then moved to the Golan Heights. Over that period, I gradually, and then more quickly lost the political aspects of my faith that brought me here, though my religious opinions have changed relatively little. We moved to the Golan in order to escape the very high rents in most of Israel, and also because we like to be besides unspoiled countryside which is increasingly difficult in Israel.

Q: Yes, the rent rates and house prices in Israel are absurd. What has influenced your changes in your position towards Zionism over the years and where would you see yourself now, given that you call your blog ‘non-Zionism’ and don’t position yourself as an ‘anti-Zionist’?

A: Well, when I came to Israel I was one of those who wanted to completely transform the Israeli state into a religious vision. This would mean building the temple, establishing a theocratic government, and making Jewish law the law of the land. Because of that I was highly critical of actually-existing Israeli society, and, in fact, stopped identifying as a Zionist (even though in retrospect I was one). Then, I gradually came to believe that none of my dreams were going to happen, and that, to the extent they would be realised through the increasing political power of religious Zionism they would not be, ‘a light to the nations’, but something at best ugly and pathetic, and likely also quite dark.

Then when October 7th happened, I had a very visceral response to the violence used by Hamas and other Palestinians, and it caused me to seriously reflect on what was advocated by the far Right in Israel. I had been engaged in a mixture of ‘cope’ in thinking they didn’t really mean it and also thinking the ends would justify the means. It occurred to me that probably many Palestinians over the past few decades had been in the same mindset and I decided that, whatever happened, I would not be party in any way to something like that. To be honest, I thought the Israeli response was going to be more brutal than it was (and it would have been had it reflected popular opinion).

To answer the second part of your question, the more I learn about the history of Zionism, the more I see it as a bad idea, but one thing that has not changed at all, and, indeed, has only intensified is that I think that Palestinian nationalism has been a terrible ideology with no good consequences at all, and a long string of atrocities to its name. So, in as much as anti-Zionism means supporting Palestinian nationalism, I don’t want anything to do with that whatsoever. So what’s left is non-Zionism. I simply don’t believe in it. What I do believe, I don’t really know, but after a year and a half of blogging about it, I think I’m getting somewhere.

Q: In what sense do you see Zionism as a bad idea? I have to admit that if I were a Jew and I had a choice between the United States or Israel, I would choose the United States, because it does generally seem safer to be a Jew there, plus the high cost of living situation vs. low salaries in Israel. I am speaking of course from a material perspective in that regard. But explain your own perspective.

A: But I’m from the UK, which is, in many ways, a basket case, and it’s not very tempting to go back there. To answer your main question, though, it’s actually really simple. At the beginning of the 20th century there were perhaps 8 million Jews in Eastern Europe, and 500,000 people in Palestine. The plan of Zionism was just to go there, become the majority and the natives would go along with it, and even if they didn’t, they wouldn’t be able to do much about it. What they failed to predict was that the Arab population would go through the same demographic explosion European Jewry had started 150 years prior because of basic sanitation, draining malaria swamps, fertiliser, all the usual stuff, which has happened everywhere by now. Because of that, the plan was doomed from the start, and everything since has been an attempt to deal with that. The ridiculous thing is that none of the early Zionists even considered this problem. They thought about obstacles to Jewish immigration, but it never occurred to them that even with mass immigration the Arabs would just outgrow them naturally.

Q: If I understand what was or is the mainstream ‘liberal Zionist’ case though (does it not still exist in some of the leftist quarters in Israel?), the idea is that it would be possible to maintain a Jewish majority state within what are Israel’s internationally recognised borders, while keeping the demographic problem confined to a Palestinian state at least within the West Bank. You yourself don’t think that’s a viable idea?

Also, while you say Zionism is itself a bad idea, do you believe that Israel as a Jewish state is at least worth maintaining because it’s now been around for 80 years, and most of the Israeli Jews there today have only ever known Israel as its home? I have to say one of the silliest things I see among leftist anti-Zionists is that Israelis can just go back to their countries of origin, as though e.g. Yemenite Jews would want to back to Houthi-controlled Yemen, leaving aside also how many Israelis are now born into families who trace lineages to multiple countries.

A: So, it’s viable to salvage Zionism via partition (which required ethnic cleansing) in the trivial sense that this is what actually happened. Part of my non-Zionism is trying to argue that, instead of being dissatisfied with that arrangement as right-wing Zionists are, we should realise that it actually ended up a lot better for us than it might have. We got away with quite a lot, partly because of the Holocaust, partly because of diaspora Jewry lobbying, and partly because the Arab world at the time was just very primitive and incompetent. So we should try to hang on to that rather than gambling on something better.

But, I do not actually believe ‘Israel as a Jewish state is at least worth maintaining’. In principle, I’m completely indifferent to the idea. We should do what’s best without any regard at all to how well it does or doesn’t conform to Zionist principles. In practice, I think maintaining the status quo while trying to get on better with other countries in the region is better than any other option, but not because it fulfils Zionism, just because it’s the option with the least death and destruction. However, obviously the Gaza war tests that theory. I value Palestinian life less than Jewish life and I’m not ashamed to say that. I don’t think we or anyone else are obligated to commit suicide because of past injustice, or even present injustice. But I don’t value it infinitely less. There’s a point when I think that this is so ghastly that we have to roll the dice on some kind of other arrangement. So what I’d like is for Israelis to calm down so we don’t get to that point.

I’m a conservative basically. It comes with age.

Q: In what ways could Israel try to get on better with other countries in the region? As far as Lebanon goes, for example, I very much understand the Israeli concern in the sense that Hezbollah is committed to ending Israel’s existence (the fact they call places like Tel Aviv ‘occupied’ is a pretty good indication), plus the fact that the Lebanese authorities and security forces haven’t proven reliable in disarming Hezbollah. Is there a different approach you would suggest there?

I think in the case of Syria there’s a stronger case to be made that Israel’s policy has been too hostile from the outset and is unproductive. For example the protection of the Druze is an understandable policy but it is not used to advance a way forward to resolve the issue. Similarly the ongoing incursions versus what might have been a better approach of taking a step back, making clear any attacks on Israeli territory would be met with retaliation and trying to cement terms through a ceasefire agreement.

A: The obvious thing is to be less brutal towards the Palestinians. This is not as simple as flicking a switch, because there are genuine security needs, which require checkpoints and the like. However, the truth is we haven’t been trying for decades, and since October 7th, we just let fanatics go around committing terrorism in the West Bank. Simply going back to basic standards of law and order would be something.

However, there is a more fundamental issue, which is that we literally don’t try to win over Arab cultural elites at all. We have Arab Israelis who are very patriotic, not the majority by any means, but tens of thousands for sure, and what we do with them is parade them before western audiences to show we are liberal, which used to work, but now doesn’t. It has never occurred to anyone to use them as ambassadors either to the Palestinians, or the wider Arab world. English is the single most important subject in the Israeli education system (outside of religious schools), partly for economic reasons, but also because it’s understood that we need to be able to ‘explain’ ourselves (the meaning of hasbara). But Arabic is completely neglected.

I personally am not a great fan of Arab culture. If I lived in Europe I would vote in favour of basically zero immigration from the Middle East (no offence), but we are here, and we have to deal with the people we have to deal with. Islamic history is a mixed bag, but there’s plenty to admire in its artistic and intellectual heritage. I’m not delusional about there being a huge amount of irrational hate for us in the Arab world, but you have to start from somewhere.

In Lebanon, plainly there is no point reaching out to Hezbollah and its supporters, but the fact is that most Christians there hate us too. We can blame them, and it’s true to a large extent, but we can only control what we do.

The dominant Israeli narrative is the opposite. “This is the Middle East’, so we should act like our neighbours: brutal, perpetually aggrieved, refusing to budge on anything. But how well has this worked out for them? While there’s a lot to criticise about the Labour Zionists who built the state and ruled it for the first three decades, they understood that the dysfunctionality of the Arab world was an argument *not* to act that way.

Q: There’s been increasing talk about Israel essentially heading into a ‘forever war’ approach: the constant military deployments and operations in neighbouring countries, the war with Iran but then the increasing talk of Turkey as the next main threat that has to be dealt with, by force if necessary. The ‘forever war’ in turn creates internal pressures that are likely to prove very harmful to Israel in the long-run: military conscription evasion, people leaving Israel for elsewhere (I can tell you that was a big problem here in Syria about military conscription and outward migration before the regime fell). Would that be a fair assessment?

A: Yes. I think that the majority of the electorate are completely delusional, because they don’t understand that basically all taxes are paid by people who (a) are overwhelmingly on the liberal end of Israeli politics and (b) have the skills to leave. The economy is extremely dependent on intellectual property and human capital, the most vulnerable economic assets to flight. These people pay insane taxes, insane rents, and then have abuse hurled on them by the majority who blame them for the Oslo Accords and October 7th, plus they are facing the prospect of being on a war-footing indefinitely, which for many of them means taking 2 months out a year to be in Gaza. I think a well-designed sanctions regime with incentives for these people to leave could crash the whole project in a year. The counter-argument is that, rationally speaking, they should have left already, so perhaps whatever is keeping them here, can keep them here for good.

The talk about pivoting to Turkey was really deranged. There was a lot of crazy euphoria in the first week of this war.

Q: You are often critical of Hasbarists on your blog. It does seem to me as though there has been a drastic decline in the quality of Hasbara over the decades. When I see how Hasbara is represented today in personalities like Eylon Levy, Eyal Yakoby and Adam Louis-Klein, I find myself asking whether these people realise that their goal should be to make Israel’s case to people otherwise neutral or unsympathetic, instead of just preaching to their already ideologically committed fans. What are your thoughts on this and why is Hasbara these days so terrible?

A: Adam Louis Klein is really something else, like some kind of weird performance art.

My diagnosis is this. Contrary to what many opponents of Israel claim, Israel has never put a lot of work into its international PR, because it didn’t need to. (Ashkenazi) Jews are intelligent with a verbal tilt, and a cultural (probably also genetic) disposition to being argumentative. Israel relied for decades on this free resource of Jews willing to argue for free on their behalf, perhaps with a grant here or there, and some training courses. The problem comes with social media when the incentives fall apart, because everyone is competing for likes, and the easiest way to compete for likes is to appeal to Jews and rile them up. The fact that precisely the things that get most likes from Jews are those that are most off-putting to almost everyone else sets up a very bad dynamic. There’s no getting round the fact that Jewish culture doesn’t encourage group self-introspection, and we relied on the general taboo on anti-semitism after WW2 to smooth over the dodgy issues.

There is also another important aspect, which is that Jews are getting dumber. Intermarriage is big in the diaspora, and the smarter ones disproportionately lose Jewish affiliation over the generations. This then leads to a vicious cycle where Jewish outreach caters to the dumber audience which makes it even more repulsive to the smart ones. So relying on big bank of freelance smarty pants to do free PR for Israel isn’t sustainable anymore.

Q: I want to come back to something for a moment on the Palestinians. Daniel Pipes advocates the notion of an Israeli ‘victory’ over the Palestinians: that is, that Israel needs to make the Palestinians sense they have been ‘defeated’ and can no longer end Israel’s existence as a Jewish state- not necessarily by military means. What do you make of that idea?

A: I used to believe precisely this. I still do, in a sense, but the question is: “When the Palestinians are truly defeated, what do they do?” The implicit answer by people who believe in this is ‘dissolve’. In short, you need a political solution to give them, and that can’t be perpetual occupation.

Another problem is that you can’t just defeat the Palestinians, you also have to defeat their backer, but they can always get a new one, hence the talk about pivoting to Turkey after defeating Iran (before we even did that).

There are options, but I think they would all essentially amount to abandoning Zionism.

Q: Do you think it’s a valid concern in the long-run that the situation in the West Bank- with routine settler attacks on Palestinian land and Palestinians that even some Hasbarists are denouncing as terrorism- combined with the widespread perception of a genocide perpetrated in Gaza, will lead to growing international isolation for Israel with disastrous consequences for the country?

A: Yes.

Q: Finally, let’s talk a little about the situation in the Golan. What’s it been like with the war’s impact on daily life? Or is the region relatively shielded from the impacts compared to other parts of Israel?

A: I think it’s the safest region. None of the Iranian bombs have come anywhere close to here., and even Hezbollah concentrates on Northern Israel and largely ignores us. I’m not sure if that’s because of some kind of idea that it is Syria’s job to liberate the Golan, because logistically they could easily hit us here. Of those rockets that do come, 95% are intercepted. If I recall correctly, we have less than 5 impacts in our town over the course of the whole three years, and these were mostly shrapnel.

We have a reinforced room that acts as a bomb shelter in our house, as does every house and flat built since the 1990s. The kids sleep there, and if there is a siren we all go there. During the heaviest periods of the war, this can be quite disturbing for sleep, but given what other people have to put up with, there’s really nothing to complain about.

Q: Has the war led to a discernible impact on prices of goods and commodities where you live?

A: There have been shortages, particularly of milk, but I’m not even sure that the war has been the determinative factor. We are quite a backwards country in some ways, and still have price controls. The price of living has gone up, but, to be honest, the most difficult issue for me personally, has been the strength of the shekel against the pound since I still earn most of my money from England.

]]><![CDATA[An Insider Account of the Jihadist Insurgency in West Africa (I)]]>https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/an-insider-account-of-the-jihadisthttps://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/an-insider-account-of-the-jihadistThu, 16 Apr 2026 18:16:41 GMTOver the past few months, ‘Adnan Absi’- an Islamic State-aligned jihadist active on social media- has issued a multi-part series discussing the history of the jihadist insurgency in West Africa (centred on Nigeria): in particular, the evolution of the group’s ‘West Africa Province’, which was initially constituted following the pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State’s caliph (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) by Abu Bakr Shekau, who led the group Jama‘at Ahl al-Sunna lil-Da‘wa al-Jihad (‘The Group of the Sunnis for Da‘wa and Jihad), commonly known as Boko Haram. As has been documented previously, however, a split subsequently occurred in which Shekau’s faction lost recognition as the Islamic State’s official affiliate and ended up being at war with the ‘West Africa Province.’

Although ‘West Africa Province’ launched a large-scale offensive against Shekau’s group in 2021 and Shekau himself was killed, the split continues to have ramifications today with occasional reports of clashes between ‘West Africa Province’ and remnants of Shekau’s allies. Indeed, in its al-Naba’ newsletter, the Islamic State published an account of ‘Abu Yahya al-Muhajir’, who was originally from Niger, joined the group’s West Africa affiliate, and was killed by the ‘Khawarij’ (the Islamic State’s designation for Shekau and his allies).

Below is a translation of the first three parts of Absi’s account of the ‘West Africa’ insurgency. The series will be continued in subsequent posts.

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]]><![CDATA[Christian Villages in South Lebanon Caught in the Crossfire]]>https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/christian-villages-in-south-lebanonhttps://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/christian-villages-in-south-lebanonWed, 15 Apr 2026 11:16:04 GMTIsraeli military operations in south Lebanon are focused at the moment on capturing the Shia town of Bint Jbeil, which has symbolic importance for Hezbollah as a historic stronghold of ‘resistance’ against Israel given that Israel was unable to capture it during the 2006 war with Hezbollah. In contrast with the heavy fighting in Bint Jbeil, Israeli forces have not entered three Christian villages located just southwest of Bint Jbeil, but these villages effectively find themselves isolated and caught in the crossfire following the withdrawal of the Lebanese army. These villages are Rmeich, Ein Abel and Debl.

As the war continues in south Lebanon, there is much debate on the outside about issues such as normalisation of relations between Israel and Lebanon and disarmament of Hezbollah. Many residents of the three Christian villages are angry with Hezbollah because they see it as having dragged Lebanon into war although they may not express this sentiment openly amid their uncertainty about the political future for south Lebanon. Their foremost concern is simply for the region to be spared further war and find a lasting peace.

Below are two interviews (edited and condensed for clarity), the first with a resident of Rmeich conducted on 12 April regarding the situation in the village amid the war between Israel and Hezbollah. The second is an interview with a person from Ain Ebel, also conducted on 12 April and concerning the situation in that village.




(Interview with resident of Rmeich)

Q: Can you provide us with a picture of the situation in the locality in terms of availability of goods, electricity, water and fuel?

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]]><![CDATA[Internal Divisions Within the Alawite Insurgency in Syria]]>https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/internal-divisions-within-the-alawitehttps://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/internal-divisions-within-the-alawiteTue, 14 Apr 2026 23:38:52 GMTOf the various trends of skepticism and opposition to the new government among Syria’s minority communities, the Alawite insurgency has so far proven the least successful. It has not managed to secure any meaningful concessions or gains for the community whose interests it claims to uphold. Further, while security incidents occasionally take place on the coastal region, there is no imminent risk of an Alawite insurgent takeover of the coastal region, a coup against the government or even necessarily a repeat of a major coordinated insurgent action that preceded the coastal massacres in March 2025.

A major part of the issue is that the insurgency does not have a foreign patron that actively intervenes on its behalf inside Syria. By contrast, American diplomatic mediation for the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has helped secure at least some concessions in terms of government appointments for SDF figures, such as leading SDF commander Sipan Hamo being appointed deputy defence minister for Syria’s eastern region. Likewise, active Israeli military intervention for the Druze in al-Suwayda’ has allowed (for the time being) Druze factions aligned with Hikmat al-Hijri and united under the ‘National Guard’ initiative to retain security control over parts of al-Suwayda’ province.

But it is also clear that the Alawite insurgency is marked by internal divisions and has not produced a unified coalition analogous to the ‘National Guard’ coalition of Druze factions, even if many of the insurgents proclaim support for Alawite cleric Ghazal Ghazal.

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]]><![CDATA[Anti-Hamas Armed Groups in Gaza: Interview with 'The Popular Defence Forces']]>https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/anti-hamas-armed-groups-in-gaza-interview-d2fhttps://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/anti-hamas-armed-groups-in-gaza-interview-d2fSat, 11 Apr 2026 11:02:37 GMTFor prior interviews in this series, see:

. The ‘Popular Army’ in Gaza
. The ‘Free Homeland Forces’
. Interview with Hussam al-Astl

Of the various new armed groups in Gaza that are opposed to Hamas and are linked to Israel, the ‘Popular Defence Forces’ in the south of the strip is probably the least well-known. It is not to be confused with another ‘Popular Defence Forces’ located in Shejaiya further north in the strip and led by one Rami Hillis. Featuring an affiliate called the ‘Martyr Khalil al-Wazir Battalion’ (named for a leading Fatah figure who was assassinated by the Mossad in Tunisia), the southern ‘Popular Defence Forces’ was hailed by ‘Popular Forces’ (aka ‘Counterterrorism Service’) leader Ghassan Duhine as ‘one of the foundational auxiliary forces that assist the Counterterrorism Service’ when it offered condolences on the death of the Popular Forces’ first leader Yasser Abu Shabab in December 2025 (see below).


Below is an interview I recently conducted with a representative of the ‘Popular Defence Forces’ to learn more about its origins, activities and outlook on Gaza. It is edited and condensed for clarity.

Emblem of the southern ‘Popular Defence Forces.’

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]]><![CDATA[A Local Damascus Countryside Council's New Social Regulations]]>https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/a-local-damascus-countryside-councilshttps://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/a-local-damascus-countryside-councilsFri, 10 Apr 2026 17:24:09 GMTSo far, initiatives to impose social regulations along the lines of an Islamist outlook have primarily been confined to the provincial and local level. A new set of regulations issued by a municipal council in Damascus countryside is the latest example of this trend. On 8 April, the executive office of the municipal office of Mnin (located north of Damascus city in the al-Tall region) issued a set of social regulations pertaining to, among other topics, blasphemy against Islam, consumption and sale of alcoholic drinks and dress for females and males. Some of the other regulations listed are more reasonable and common-sense (e.g. prohibition on cutting down trees and vandalising public facilities).

A question of note here is whether all the regulations specified actually come within the remit of the municipal council. In the absence of clear new regulations from the transition government, the council cites the Local Administration Law of 2011 (issued by the prior regime) as a basis for its decision-making.

The regulations are translated in full below.

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]]><![CDATA[The Amal Movement and the New War in Lebanon: Interview]]>https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/the-amal-movement-and-the-new-warhttps://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/the-amal-movement-and-the-new-warTue, 07 Apr 2026 15:04:10 GMTWhile Hezbollah remains the most prominent faction representing the Shia community in Lebanon, the Amal Movement- founded by Lebanese cleric Musa al-Sadr- also enjoys the support of a sizeable contingent of Lebanese Shia, as illustrated by its representation in the Lebanese parliament. Although not ideologically aligned with Iran in the way that Hezbollah is (e.g. the movement does not declare loyalty to Iran’s Supreme Leader), Amal has primarily functioned as a junior partner of Hezbollah with Lebanon since 2005 when Hezbollah first entered the Lebanese government.

There is no doubt that the Amal’s leadership did not want to see a return to open war with Israel following Hezbollah’s losses in the 2023-2024 war (in which Amal members also participated as a junior partner) and the devastation inflicted on parts of Lebanon during that period. As the new round of war commenced on 2 March, some observers who were more hopeful about Hezbollah’s disarmament saw signs of a possible split between Amal and Hezbollah amid reports that Amal leader Nabih Berri agreed to the Lebanese government cabinet decision to ban Hezbollah’s military and security activities. Such hopes were also amplified by some early media reports on the anger of some Lebanese Shia with Hezbollah’s decision to reactivate the war front, amid war weariness and fear of further displacement and destruction.

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]]><![CDATA['Exit Without Departure'- What Remains of Iranian Influence and Networks in Syria]]>https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/exit-without-departure-what-remainshttps://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/exit-without-departure-what-remainsFri, 03 Apr 2026 18:48:06 GMT

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My latest feature article for Syria in Transition (reproduced below) examines the question of what, if anything, remains of Iranian influence and networks in Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime. While the regime’s collapse constituted a severe setback for Iran and the ‘axis of resistance’, this does not mean support for Iran- such as on the ideological level- has disappeared entirely.

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]]><![CDATA[Islamic State Editorial: 'Our Aqsa and Our Prisoners']]>https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/islamic-state-editorial-our-aqsahttps://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/islamic-state-editorial-our-aqsaFri, 03 Apr 2026 11:35:25 GMTWithin the Arab world, there has been much focus in popular media recently on a new Israeli law that would apply the death penalty to Palestinian militants, with widespread rumours of an imminent execution of thousands of Palestinian prisoners being held by Israel. This populist anger has translated, for example, into pro-Palestinian demonstrations in parts of Syria focusing both on the Palestinian prisoners and the ongoing Israeli closure of al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.

Hamas’ spokesman Abu Obayda even offered an expression of thanks for the demonstrations in Syria. Contrary though to what has been suggested by some Syrian exiles, the demonstrations are not evidence of an Iranian hand or influence. Rather, they reflect mobilisation by some Palestinians in Syria and members of the Syrian Sunni Arab constituency for a cause that still has popular resonance among Sunnis in the country, even as Syria’s new leadership continues to signal that it does not want a confrontation with Israel.

For its part, the Islamic State has seized on the news and the popular attention given to it, engaging in a typical example of its ‘reframing’ technique. That is, the group will note something that grabs popular attention, then try to highlight the contrasting lack of attention to what it sees as similar if not worse suffering of those Muslims who are members and supporters of the Islamic State.

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]]><![CDATA[Coastal Alawite Perspectives: Interview with an Alawite Student Expelled from University]]>https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/coastal-alawite-perspectives-interview-35ehttps://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/coastal-alawite-perspectives-interview-35eThu, 02 Apr 2026 23:39:28 GMT(For a prior interview in this series, see interview with an activist from the Latakia locality of al-Bahluliya).

At the end of February, a controversy arose over reports of a decision by Latakia University to expel an Alawite student- Ghazal Salman- who was studying at the agricultural college in the university. According to Ghazal’s critics, her expulsion was justified for allegedly blaspheming Islam, attacking the Syrian revolution, attacking the new flag and the Syrian president Ahmad al-Sharaa, and glorifying elements of the Alawite insurgency against the new government. Some of the social media posts attributed to her that were cited as proof for these charges can no longer be seen on her existing social media profile.

For Ghazal’s supporters, she was expelled on a sectarian basis. She herself appeared in a video denying that she was expelled for attacking Sharaa or anyone else. Rather, she claimed that her expulsion was tied to commemorating the victims of the coastal massacres of Alawites that took place in March 2025. Echoing a line that I was also told by a person proclaiming affiliation with the Alawite insurgent brand ‘Coastal Shield,’ she addressed her critics: “You claim to belong to our Islam, you don’t know Islam.” In a subsequent video though, she asserted that any denunciation of (Sunni) Islam she made was in response to Sunni denunciations of Alawite religion and shrines, and that she had friends from all sects, including Sunnis. As for the charge of supporting ‘regime remnants,’ she asserted that “the resistance was just a matter of defending the martyrs of the massacres on the coast and other massacres….any person who defends against oppression is one who resists.”

Last month I interviewed Ghazal so she could elaborate more on her own perspective and outlook on Syria.

The document circulated on social media regarding Ghazal’s expulsion from Latakia University.

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]]><![CDATA[Displaced Syrian Shia in Lebanon: Interview]]>https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/displaced-syrian-shia-in-lebanonhttps://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/displaced-syrian-shia-in-lebanonTue, 24 Mar 2026 21:58:40 GMTWith the fall of the Assad regime, a considerable number of Syrian Shia ended up becoming displaced in Lebanon, primarily originating from areas of Homs governorate. Some of those displaced were working with Hezbollah as the regime collapsed and appear to have continued their relationship with the group after the regime fell. For example, one individual from the Homs locality of al-Diyabiya- Ridha Muhammad Assaf- was reported on 16 March to have been killed in fighting for Hezbollah in south Lebanon (see below, his nom de guerre being Fida’). His brother Abbas, who remained behind in Syria, was assassinated not long after the news of Ridha’s death was publicised.


The displaced Syrian Shia in Homs now find themselves caught between a rock and a hard place: afraid or unable to return home, and now facing Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon.

To discuss the Syrian Shia in Lebanon and their experiences of displacement, I conducted an interview with Husayn Masto, a Syrian Shiite originally from Homs governorate and now displaced in Lebanon. This interview was conducted on 21 March and is edited and condensed for clarity.

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]]><![CDATA['Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya' and Claimed Attacks on Jewish Targets in Europe]]>https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/harakat-ashab-al-yamin-al-islamiyahttps://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/harakat-ashab-al-yamin-al-islamiyaTue, 24 Mar 2026 13:56:51 GMT

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One of the wider consequences of the U.S. and Israeli war against Iran has been a rise in reported attacks on perceived ‘Zionist’ and ‘American’ targets in Europe. These attacks- spanning from Greece to Britain- have been claimed on social media by a group called Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya (‘Islamic Movement of the People of the Right’). The concept of ‘Ashab al-Yamin’ (‘People of the Right’) is ultimately derived from the Qur’an and refers to the believers who will go to Paradise.

Attacks claimed thus far by the group include:

- Attack on a synagogue in Liege, Belgium (claimed 9 March).
- Attack on a ‘Zionist target’ in Greece with an IED (claimed 11 March).
- Attack on a synagogue in Rotterdam, Netherlands (claimed 13 March).
- Attack on a synagogue in Amsterdam, Netherlands (claimed 14 March).
- Attack on the World Trade Center in Amsterdam, Netherlands (claimed 16 March, within the framework of going after American-linked targets).
- More recently, attacking a synagogue in London (claimed 23 March).

Aymenn’s Monstrous Publications is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

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]]><![CDATA[A 'Clarification' from Damascus Governorate on Restricting Sale of Alcoholic Drinks]]>https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/a-clarification-from-damascus-governoratehttps://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/a-clarification-from-damascus-governorateMon, 23 Mar 2026 23:14:30 GMTThe decision by Damascus governorate to restrict the sale of alcoholic drinks has sparked some local controversy, including a demonstration in Bab Touma (a historically Christian area of Damascus) in opposition to the regulations, complaining that they discriminate between Syrians and negatively impact the country’s diversity and personal freedoms. The decisions were also implicitly criticised by Hind Kabawat, the Christian minister of social affairs and labour, on the basis that they negatively associate Christian areas in Damascus with alcoholic drinks rather than their embodying the ‘heart of Damascus’ and a ‘place for co-existence’ that respects diversity, which itself encapsulates the ‘strength’ of the Syrian state.

Amid the controversy, Damascus governorate has issued a ‘clarification’ on the new regulations. The clarification does not itself constitute a retraction of the regulations. Rather, it generally seeks to justify them as representing continuity with older legislation and decisions in the modern Syrian state, but it does emphasise that facilities of relevance to tourists are either exempt from the regulations or will be subject to further consideration.

Below is the clarification fully translated.

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]]><![CDATA[New Damascus Governorate Regulations on Alcoholic Drinks]]>https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/new-damascus-governorate-regulationshttps://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/new-damascus-governorate-regulationsTue, 17 Mar 2026 00:41:49 GMTSince the fall of the Assad regime, observers have wondered what type of government would emerge in Syria. From an early stage, it was clear to me that those leading the government- in particular, the former Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham leaders, including Ahmad al-Sharaa, and senior figures in the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham-backed Salvation Government that was based out of Idlib and its environs- are Islamist in orientation, by which I mean that they strive for a society whose main source of legislation is deemed to be Islamic law and jurisprudence. Of course, what exact form of governance that entails is not entirely set in stone, but at least some decisions- both local and national- should be expected that are influenced by stipulations of Islamic law and jurisprudence.

A recent decision issued by Damascus governorate- which is governed by Maher Idlibi (who served as a leading judicial figure in the Salvation Government and is an in-law of al-Sharaa)- is an example of this trend. The decision includes restrictions on sales of alcoholic drinks within Damascus, effectively limiting their sale to historically Christian areas. It is translated in full below with annotations in square brackets.

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]]><![CDATA[Kobani After the SDF-Syrian Government Agreement: Interview]]>https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/kobani-after-the-sdf-syrian-governmenthttps://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/kobani-after-the-sdf-syrian-governmentSun, 15 Mar 2026 22:06:55 GMTFollowing the Syrian government’s offensive in January that took much of the territory held by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the two sides- through U.S. mediation- subsequently came to a revised agreement on 29 January on terms that were largely favourable to the Syrian government, effectively stipulating the end of the SDF’s existence as an autonomous military and governing entity.

Such a line was reinforced recently by the spokesman for the central government’s team overseeing the merger process in Hasakah province- Ahmad al-Hilali (who previously served as a leading official for Ahrar al-Sham in the province)- in recent remarks to Syrian state TV channel al-Ikhbariya, focusing on the role of the SDF’s Asayish [internal security forces] in Hasakah province and the merger process for them (highlights in bold are my own):

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]]><![CDATA[A Medieval Retelling of the Story of Aeneas]]>https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/a-medieval-retelling-of-the-storyhttps://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/a-medieval-retelling-of-the-storySat, 14 Mar 2026 15:11:44 GMT

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Thanks to Virgil’s epic the Aeneid, the story of the wanderings of Aeneas from Troy to Italy following Troy’s destruction by the Greeks became well-known and established as Rome’s founding myth. The transmission of the Aeneid continued into the Middle Ages, but there were also other Latin works studied and disseminated as part of understanding the history of Troy and Rome’s earliest foundations. One work in this latter category is the Excidium Troie (‘Destruction of Troy’), which primarily focuses on Aeneas’ wanderings and final settlement in Italy. In turn, the Excidium Troie could be subject to abbreviation and paraphrase.

The following post presents a translation and overview of one such abbreviation and paraphrase of the Excidium Troie that ultimately appears to go back to southern Italy in the 10th century CE, forming part of what its editor Marek Kretschmer calls a ‘historical miscellany…conceived as a continuous universal history determined by the idea of translatio imperii’ (i.e. the transfer of worldly power from one nation to another). In this case, the paraphrase of the Excidium is paired with Paul the Deacon’s Roman History.

The most striking feature is the way that the paraphrase attempts to ‘demythologise’ the story as far as possible. Thus, in explaining the origins of the Trojan War (only a minor part of the narrative), the paraphrase stresses that figures like Jupiter, Neptune and Apollo were ‘called gods’. In detailing Aeneas’ wanderings and settlement in Italy, the divine element that is to be found in the Aeneid is expunged entirely. For example, in the Aeneid, the goddess Juno (counterpart to the Greek goddess Hera) is a divine antagonist of Aeneas, thwarting his initial attempt to reach Italy and supporting the Italian prince Turnus once Aeneas arrives in Italy. Likewise, messages from gods and prophets are replaced with impersonal phrasing about something appearing to Aeneas in a dream and communicating a message.

This paraphrase of the Excidium Troie is also significant because it is likely the backbone source for Toledan archbishop Rodrigo Ximénez de Rada’s (d. 1247 CE) narrative of Aeneas’ wanderings and settlement in Italy in his Historia Romanorum (‘History of the Romans’), the first supplemental volume to his history of Spain project. The connection was spotted by Helena de Carlos Villamarín in 2019 (which I had not noticed in my translation and commentary on the Historia Romanorum as part of my study of Rodrigo’s Minor Histories). Although Rodrigo knew the Aeneid and made use of it and Ovid’s work in his narrative of Aeneas (a story he considers to have taken place in the real light of history minus the role of Graeco-Roman deities, just as many medieval authors did), there are multiple parallels in both content and phrasing that point to his use of the paraphrase as the foundational source, most notably:

(i) Palinurus dies in a storm before Aeneas and his fleet reach Africa.

(ii) Aeneas being told in a dream he will first marry Dido and then go to Italy, as well as the notion that the two were actually married.

(iii) A factor driving Dido of Carthage to fall in love with Aeneas is his appearance in his arms of war.

(iv) Aeneas being told in a dream, after his arrival in Italy, that he will find a white pig with 30 offspring under an oak-tree.

(v) A specific note that in ancient times, peace was signified by carrying an olive branch.

(vi) The sequence of events for the deaths of Mezentius and his son Lausus.

(vii) An escort of 100 men to console Aeneas’ ally Evander on the death of his son Pallas.

(viii) Diomedes’ explanation for rejecting King Latinus’ petition to provide him help against Aeneas.

An innovation on Rodrigo’s part, however, is that he has Aeneas leave Carthage because he considers the depiction of the story of Troy at Carthage to be something shameful. It is possible that he became aware of the paraphrase of Excidium Troie and Paul the Deacon’s Roman History (which he also used as a source of the Historia Romanorum) through his visits to Italy.

Below is the paraphrase of Excidium Troie fully translated and annotated by me.




1. Thetis was Achilles’ mother and Thesis was chosen from among 50 Nereites, and we will say from where the Nereites got their name. Nereus was the husband and Ita was the wife. And so with the two names combined, their daughters were called Nereites. Thetis was Achilles’ mother, for the aforementioned Nereus and his wife lived on an island and there they begat 50 daughters. Because of this, it is said in myth that the Nereites live in the sea, because they were begotten on that island. Among these Nereites was Thetis. Jupiter loved her, and when he asked whether he should take her as his wife, the response was given to him that if he were to take her as his wife, the son born to her would depose his father. Fearing this, Jupiter gave the aforementioned Thetis as a wife to a young man called Peleus, and thus he held wedding celebrations.

2. Hence the event was called the feast of the gods, for Jupiter, Neptune, Apollo and Mercury (who were called gods) participated in it. With them also were three goddesses: i.e. Juno, Minerva and Venus, but they did not invite the goddess of Lis,[i] whose name means discord. Owing to the grief she felt because she was not invited, the goddess of Discordia made a golden apple that is commonly called milum, and wrote on it: ‘Let this be the gift of the goddess who is more beautiful than the others. When the goddesses beheld the aforementioned milum, they held it among themselves, and a dispute arose among them as to who should take it, and all of them began to argue about their beauty. They asked Jupiter to judge among them as to which one of them was most beautiful. But he did not want to rebuke any of them and replied: ‘I cannot be the judge between you, but I will give you a judge to judge between you. Go to the mountain called Ideus which lies under Troy. Paris the shepherd is there. He alone will be able to judge between you, because he is a just judge.’




3. We will say why this Paris was called a just judge. This Paris was the son of King Priam of Troy, born to his wife Hecuba. While Hecuba was still pregnant with him in her womb, a fire broke out and burned all of Troy. When she asked the temples what the dream meant, it was said in response that a son would be born to her through whom Troy would perish. This is what happened.

4. But after Troy was captured by the Greeks, Aeneas, his father Anchises and Aeneas’ son Ascanius got out. They had 20 ships. After facing many dangers and many tribulations they endured at sea, they reached Sicily. There Aeneas’ father Anchises died.

5. From there, when Aeneas wanted to go to Italy, a wind suddenly came, and the sea was stirred, and an intense storm arose, which sank one of Aeneas’ ships. And there he lost his skipper Palinurus. Hence Aeneas and all the others on the ship were very saddened.

6. Subsequently, Aeneas reached Africa with his other ships. While he was there, something appeared to him in a dream during the night, saying: ‘Although you should go to Italy and rule there, nonetheless first accept Dido here as your wife.’ This is what happened. Aeneas married her but only stayed with her for six months. Aeneas, all his men and the aforementioned Dido were joyful.

7. On many occasions Aeneas went with her to hunt in the woods. One day when, as we have said, the two went together to hunt, they say that a great rain-shower caught them in the word, such that all fled and they looked for places to protect themselves from the rain. Aeneas and Dido found a cave, and there they say that he first lay carnally with her.[ii] Then when the rain-shower passed, they returned to Dido’s home.

8. Dido was of the Sidonian race. She built Africa and established a temple there where she depicted the entire story of Troy’s captivity. Aeneas entered the temple with his arm-bearer Achates and when he saw the picture, he began to weep greatly and thus say: ‘Woe is you, poor Troy, for there is no land where there has been no announcement of your perdition.’

9. When Dido first saw Aeneas, he was wearing his breastplate and helmet, and thus Dido loved him.

10. After Aeneas took Dido as his wife, something came to him in his dreams, saying: ‘Leave Dido and go to Italy.’

11. Queen Dido, Aeneas’ wife, killed herself out of love for him because he left her.




12. Aeneas left Africa and went away to Italy again,[iii] where his father had died. There he celebrated the anniversary of his father’s death, and from there he sailed to Italy and came to the city- called a harbour- on the river Tiber.

13. The men of that city came and said to him: ‘Sir, from which city are you?’ Aeneas responded: ‘I am Aeneas, the son-in-law of King Priam of Troy, and when Troy was taken by the Greeks, the gods told me in a dream that I should rule in Italy.’ The men of that place told him: ‘How will you be able to rule in this land, because our king Latinus is the son of King Faunus and the grandson of King Picus, and Picus was Saturn’s son. This Latinus- our king- rules over a large population and has a son-in-law called Turnus, who is the son of King Drusus Daunus.[iv] And how will you be able to take rule away from him?’

14. Hearing this, Aeneas began to feel sad, and because of his great sadness, sleep came upon him, and something came to him in a dream, telling him: ‘Do not be troubled by what the men of this land told you, but go to King Evander, who resides in the seven hills’ (where Rome was subsequently founded). ‘He is on inimical terms with King Latinus. He will give you help. And fight against Latinus, because the kingdom of Italy belongs to you. and so that you should believe that what I am telling you is true, I will give you this sign: when you set out, you will find a white pig under an oak tree (this pig is commonly called a scrofa). It has thirty white offspring.’[v]

15. When Aeneas woke from sleep, he got on a ship and began to set out, and as was told to him in his dream, he found the scrofa under an oak tree with thirty white offspring. Subsequently, a city was built there that was named Albana.[vi] When Evander saw Aeneas coming to him, he thought Aeneas was an enemy, and prepared to fight against him. When Aeneas saw this, he brought an olive branch and showed it to Evander. For the custom among the ancients at that time was that the one who peacefully came from one land to another would carry an olive branch in his hand in order to show that he was not coming to engage in a quarrel, but rather to make peace. When Evander saw the olive branch in Aeneas’ hand, he came to meet him, received him and dined with him, for on that day Evander was celebrating a festive occasion. Later the two went to have a chat and signed a pact between them for the purpose of fighting against Latinus.

16. When Latinus heard that Aeneas had gone to Evander, he ordered Turnus to attack Aeneas’ son Ascanius.

17. When Ascanius saw that Turnus was coming to attack him with a multitude of men, he was troubled with fear and said: ‘We need a very brave man to go and report this to my father, so that my father should free us from the hand of these enemies, and I should give that man half of my father’s realm.’ With him were two very brave young men. One was called Nisus, the other Euryalus.[vii] They told him: ‘Swear to us that when you become ruler, you will give us half of it. We are going to scatter about the enemy, go to your father, and free you.’ Ascanius swore to them that he would give them half of the kingdom.




18. They left the fort by night and came to the camp where Turnus was. His men all lay drunk. The two men killed many of them and carried away a golden helmet we commonly call a cassis. They said to each other: ‘Let’s get out of here, for daylight is already approaching.’ They got out and began to depart. In the meantime, Latinus ordered for his people to help his son-in-law Turnus where he was besieging Aeneas’ son Ascanius. When Euryalus and Nisus saw them coming, they began to flee and hide in a forest. But the helmet on Euryalus’ helmet shone. When the men who were coming to help Turnus (who was besieging Aeneas’ son Ascanius) saw this, they began to pursue the two men. They caught them, beheaded them, took their heads and threw them inside the fort where Ascanius was shut in. When Ascanius saw this, he became very afraid.

19. Then Aeneas came with the army Evander had given him, and began to fight against Turnus (who was besieging his son Ascanius), defeating the latter. Fleeing, Turnus came to the city of Laurentum where his father-in-law Latinus was residing. And so Aeneas took his army with Evander’s son Pallas (whom Evander had given to help Aeneas) and went to attack Laurentum, where Latinus was residing and where Turnus had also fled.

20. When Latinus saw that he could not oppose Aeneas and Pallas, he sent a message asking Mezentius and Camilla[viii] (the queen of the Amazons) to come and help him.

21. When they came to him, they began to fight against Aeneas. In that battle Camilla perished along with many men from Latinus’ army. On Aeneas’ side, Evander’s son Pallas died.

22. Subsequently, while all were fighting bravely, Aeneas and Mezentius came to blows. But Aeneas wounded Mezentius. Mezentius went to the river to wash his wound. Mezentius’ son Lausus came to fight against Aeneas for the second time. Aeneas said him: ‘From where are you coming, you who are doomed to die? Will you be able to raise your hand against me?’[ix] Aeneas immediately struck him and he died. Hearing of his son’s death, Mezentius was struck with great grief for his son and went to attack Aeneas. Aeneas struck Mezentius’ horse from the front. Mezentius fell onto the ground from his horse, and Aeneas stood over him and killed him.

23. Aeneas returned victorious and carried Pallas’ body and all the booty he had taken in the battle. He sent Evander his son’s body together with 100 wise men to console Evander.[x]

24. After this happened, Latinus sent a message to King Diomedes who was living in [...][xi] at that time. Latinus asked him for help so he could fight against Aeneas again. Diomedes sent him a reply, saying: ‘I will not give you help to fight against Aeneas, because I know who Aeneas is. For when I went to fight against Troy, there were two great men there (i.e. Hector and Aeneas), and if there had been a third man who was just like them, Troy would not have perished.’

25. When such words were reported to Latinus, he sent a message to Aeneas, suing for peace. Aeneas sent him this reply: ‘Tell your king Latinus that I did come to this land by my own will, but rather the gods told me in a dream that I should possess the kingdom of Italy. And tell him: what benefit is it if so many people perish? Let Turnus and me fight. Whoever wins should be his son-in-law.’ Hearing this, Latinus said: ‘Truly Aeneas has spoken rightly. Why should so many men perish for one maiden? Let the fight each other. Whoever wins will receive her as a wife, and we will serve him.’ This decision was pleasing to all.




26. On the appointed day, Turnus left the city and fought against Aeneas, who struck him and cast him onto the ground. Then Turnus began to raise his hand against Aeneas and tell him: ‘You have won, you have won. Let Lavinia be your wife. Have mercy on my father Daunius.’ But when Aeneas saw Turnus girded with Pallas’ girdle, he was moved with grief and killed him.

27. When Latinus saw this, he received Aeneas in the city of Laurentum and gave him his daughter Lavinia to be his wife. After Latinus’ death, Aeneas received his kingdom and established a city that he called Lavinia after his wife. He reigned for three years and died.

Notes

[i] The text uses the word Litis, which is the genitive form of lis (meaning strife/dispute/discord/quarrel).

[ii] A similar scene is described in Aeneid IV, with Dido interpreting the carnal union as proof of marriage.

[iii] As written in the text, though the writer surely meant to say Sicily.

[iv] In the Aeneid, Daunus is the king of the Rutuli and Turnus’ father.

[v] A prophecy about a pig with thirty offspring is related to Aeneas in Aeneid III by Helenus. According to Helenus, it will be the site of Aeneas’ future city, marking an end to his toils.

[vi] Linked to the Latin word albus, which means ‘white.’

[vii] Their expedition is described in Aeneid IX.

[viii] Camilla features prominently in Aeneid XI, though she is not described there as the actual queen of the Amazons. Rather she leads a band of female warriors and they are likened to the Amazons.

[ix] cf. Aeneid X, where Aeneas says menacingly to Lausus who seeks to save his father: ‘quo moriture ruis maioraque viribus audes? fallit te incautum pietas tua’ (’Whither are you rushing, you who are doomed to die, and are you daring to do what goes beyond your strength? Your dutifulness deceives you in your lack of caution’).

[x] In the Aeneid, the escort for Pallas’ body consists of 1000 men.

[xi] Gap in the original text. Diomedes is a Greek ruler residing in Italy. The Latins petition him for help to fight Aeneas but in Aeneid XI he indicates he has no desire to help them: either they should seek help elsewhere or make peace with Aeneas.





]]><![CDATA[Coastal Alawite Perspectives: Interview with a Media Activist]]>https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/coastal-alawite-perspectives-interviewhttps://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/coastal-alawite-perspectives-interviewFri, 13 Mar 2026 14:52:05 GMTIt has been more than a year since the coastal massacres in which large numbers of Alawite civilians were killed by government forces and pro-government militiamen following a coordinated Alawite insurgent attack on government positions in Latakia. As shown in a recent investigative report by the New Arab, the process of real accountability for the massacres has been seriously flawed in both evidence gathering and investigation, while for many survivors of the massacres, the publicised trials seem more for political show and optics.

But not all Alawite experiences on the coast are uniformly bad. Some Alawite localities have enjoyed an overall better relation with the new authorities.

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