Aymenn’s Monstrous Publications

Islamic State Insurgent Activity in Iraq Post U.S.-Withdrawal

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Sat, 24 Oct 2026 23:14:17 GMT

In the wake of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq as part of concluding the counter-Islamic State mission on the ground there, the group has continued to issue official claims of attacks in Iraq at an elevated rate. A hotspot for the group’s claimed attacks right now is the wider Kirkuk countryside area, as illustrated by an ‘exclusive’ report published in the most recent edition of the group’s weekly newsletter al-Naba’, plus another attack claimed on evening of 24 October in Kirkuk countryside in which the group claimed to have destroyed an infra-red camera at a barracks of the ‘apostate tribal Hashd’ (i.e. Sunni tribal formations classified under the Hashd rubric).

Included alongside the al-Naba’ report is an infographic giving statistics on the group’s operations in Iraq during the past 50 days. The overall level of activity still remains very low and localised but it is worth monitoring for any further escalations in attacks.

Below is the translation of the al-Naba’ report and the accompanying infographic.

Statement by French Muhajirin in Idlib Denouncing ‘Siege’ Imposed on Them

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Thu, 22 Oct 2026 19:28:12 GMT

The contingent of French ‘muhajirin’ (‘migrants’) located in a camp in the Harem area of northern Idlib near the border with Turkey, led by one Omar Omsen, is known for its ideological opposition to the current Syrian government for reasons such as the government’s partnership with the United States in the realm of counter-terrorism (i.e. opposition to the idea of aligning with ‘disbelievers’ against other Muslims) and not ruling solely on the basis of Islamic law. Aligned with this contingent of French muhajirin are some Uzbek muhajirin who adopt a similar position on the Syrian government.

‘Stories from the Inside’- Hagiographies of Islamic State Fighters

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Tue, 20 Oct 2026 23:05:09 GMT

Previously, many pro-Islamic State channels on Telegram and similar social media accounts on other platforms were focused on the al-Hol camp in eastern Syria that was run by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and contained thousands of families (women and children) who had lived in Islamic State-held territory at some point. Since the closure of al-Hol camp following the Syrian government’s seizure of the camp and the mass flight or relocation of the camp’s inhabitants, the main focus of these pro-Islamic State accounts has shifted to the Roj camp located much further north in Hasakah province, which continued to remain formally under SDF administration and also contains families of women and children (especially foreigners- ‘muhajirin’) that lived in Islamic State-held territory.

The Rise and Fall of Mihrac Ural/Ali Kayali

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Sat, 17 Oct 2026 19:47:38 GMT

Recently, the Syrian government announced the arrest of Mihrac Ural/Ali Kayali, a Turkish-born Alawite who led the ‘Syrian Resistance’, also called the ‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Sanjak of Alexandretta.’ While fighting in support of the Assad regime, his militia also claimed to be working to restore the Hatay region of southern Turkey to Syrian control. In this post I will detail his rise and fall and share some experiences of my interactions with him, and assess what his arrest symbolises and the overall role of his group during the war.

Announcement by Syrian state channel al-Ikhbariah about Ural being in state custody. The photo is definitely of Ural.

Islamic State Treatise on Border and Transit Taxes

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Fri, 16 Oct 2026 14:39:17 GMT

How does the Islamic State conceive of the idea of taxes for crossing through its borders and use of its territory for business purposes, whether in terms of transit or conducting transactions there and then leaving?

It is by now a familiar point that studies on the Islamic State have disproportionately focused on the English language magazine Dabiq (which was discontinued in 2016) and propaganda messaging contained therein. By contrast, the large corpus of writings issued by the organisation’s Office of Research and Studies remains understudied. The writings provide insight into some aspects of life under Islamic State’s ‘territorial caliphate’ but also a blueprint for how Islamic State affiliates might apply aspects of governance in other parts of the world where they may seize territory, given that the office’s writings are still considered canon.

The treatise below, issued by the office in June 2016, frames the issue of transit and border taxes for business matters in terms of the concept of ‘ushr (i.e. 10% tax) and makes the following key points:

Fake News and An Armed Sectarian Mob: A Recent Case in North Aleppo

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Mon, 12 Oct 2026 14:11:02 GMT

Observers and analysts of Syria- particularly those who are supportive of the government- have repeatedly warned about ‘disinformation’ of a sectarian nature being put out by anti-government actors, such as exaggerations and fabrications about reported violations against members of minority communities. While there is some truth to what they say, the reality is that ‘fake news’ of a sectarian import is also put out and circulated among Sunni constituencies supportive of the government and has real world consequences for members of minority communities, as a recent case from north Aleppo countryside demonstrates.

‘And I Am Planning’- Islamic State Editorial on the Withdrawal of Coalition Forces from Iraq

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Sat, 10 Oct 2026 00:27:44 GMT

The 30 September marked the official withdrawal of U.S.-led coalition forces from Iraq, bringing an end to a counter-Islamic State mission that lasted for more than a decade. Islamic State insurgent activity against Iraqi government has for some time been at historically low levels. Indeed, for a number of years the group’s activities in Iraq have been at very low intensity.

However, an uptick in the number of officially claimed attacks has been observed in the build-up to the withdrawal in September and in the immediate aftermath.

‘Between 11 September and 30 September’- Pro-al-Qaeda Editorial on the FlyDubai Incident

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Sun, 04 Oct 2026 10:08:28 GMT

On 30 September, reports emerged that a FlyDubai flight heading from Dubai to Tel Aviv was forced to make an emergency landing in Saudi Arabia after a co-pilot attacked the captain and allegedly sought to crash the plane in a mass murder-suicide attempt. The co-pilot, reportedly an Omani citizen with Syrian lineage, had supposedly been removed from flight training with Oman Air because of concerns about his views, which are alleged to have been supportive of al-Qaeda.

Some observers and commentators are skeptical about the narrative of the incident for various reasons. Some of this skepticism is based on silly misconceptions: for example, the reported name of the co-pilot- Hammam al-Hammami- does not mean ‘Bathroom al-Bathroom’ as George Galloway has claimed, as the name is spelt not حمام الحمامي in Arabic press reports but همام الهمامي, which also happens to be the name of a Saudi soccer player, for example. Others are skeptical simply because the narrative of a foiled mass casualty attack supposedly serves the interests of Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, though the fact that something might be politically useful for Netanyahu does not mean a false-flag attack, just as the attacks on Jewish targets in Europe claimed by the pro-Iran group ‘Ashab al-Yamin’ were not false-flags.

While more details still need to emerge and be confirmed, the notion of a mass casualty attack targeting Israelis/Jews would very much be in keeping with what al-Qaeda advocates, given that the group believes there is a wider religious war between Muslims and Jews.

State Electricity and Water in the Syrian Shia Villages of Nubl and al-Zahara’

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Sat, 03 Oct 2026 19:15:57 GMT

While the Twelver Shia villages of Nubl and al-Zahara’ in Aleppo province generally have a good internal security situation owing to the security forces placing checkpoints at the entrance to these villages on the Aleppo-Gaziantep highway and the confiscation of weapons inside the villages, the public services situation with regards to electricity and water remains poor. One of these problems predates the fall of the Assad regime, whereas the other reflects a more recent development. Both issues are intertwined.

Islamic State Editorial on the United Nations

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Fri, 02 Oct 2026 12:26:38 GMT

One of the defining characteristics of transnational or global jihadism is opposition to the international order embodied in nation states and systems that represent that order, foremost embodied today in the United Nations (UN). For such jihadists, the system of nation states must eventually be entirely done away with and replaced with one Caliphate that rules the world. The latest Islamic State editorial, commenting on the most recent session of the UN’s General Assembly held last month, is reflective of this outlook.

The main points of the editorial are as follows:

Syrian Muslim Brotherhood Shura Council Statement

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Thu, 01 Oct 2026 21:32:26 GMT

The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria was the leading face of the insurgency against the Assad regime in the 1970s and 1980s, but during the war that eventually brought down the regime it never proved to be the leading face of the insurgency, though there were some groups that were seen in particular as linked to the Brotherhood in Syria (e.g. Faylaq al-Sham) or had Brotherhood elements in them. Instead, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, which was foundationally a Salafi group, spearheaded the overthrow of the regime.

The Memorial for the Massacre in the Alawite Village of al-Sanobar

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Fri, 25 Sep 2026 10:12:50 GMT

Whereas in the previous post I discussed a visit to a local shrine in the Alawite village of al-Sanobar that lies on the route between Latakia city and Jableh and aspects of present normality of life and security there that might contradict assumptions of a ‘genocide’ of Alawites in Syria, in this post I want to focus on the darker side of al-Sanobar’s more recent history: namely, the massacre that took place in the village in March 2025, committed by pro-government forces.

Alawite Shrines of Syria: The Shrine of Shaykh Ali in al-Sanobar

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Sun, 20 Sep 2026 12:38:48 GMT

On social media, one sometimes sees claims that Alawites in Syria are being subject to a ‘genocide.’ Points cited in support of this claim include massacres of Alawites that took place in March 2025, instances of vandalisation of Alawite shrines, instances of seizure of Alawite farmlands by Sunnis, instances of killings of Alawites in the Homs area (often framed as revenge attacks on people associated with the former regime), and instances of Alawite women being kidnapped.

None of the facts behind this claim should be denied or whitewashed. All of these things have taken place, and it is unsurprising that a number of Alawites have decided to flee Syria and take refuge in Lebanon. But it would be wrong to overgeneralise and conclude that a genocide is taking place. Reliance on news coming out on social media can give a distorted The reality is that variations and contrasts exist by locality and sometimes within the same locality. This became apparent for me during a recent visit to the village of al-Sanobar (‘Pine’) in Latakia province, lying on the route between Latakia city and Jableh.

A New Joint Statement from French and Uzbek ‘Muhajirin’ in Syria

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Mon, 14 Sep 2026 09:30:46 GMT

Among the various contingents of ‘muhajirin’ (foreigners who came to the insurgent-held areas of Syria during the war against the Assad regime), a clear alliance has emerged between a contingent of Idlib-based Uzbeks who are skeptical and critical of the current Syrian government and a contingent of French under Omar Omsen who are based in north Idlib and have issues not only with the current government but also the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham-led order in northwest Syria that preceded it.

Recently, Abd al-Razzaq al-Mahdi- a Syrian Salafi cleric who has himself been critical of what he sees as excessive inclination towards secularism on the part of the government as well as continued practices of arbitrary arrest- suggested that ‘muhajirin’ in general should either merge into government institutions, focus on da‘wa (religious outreach efforts) or simply engage in business. In response, both contingents have issued a joint statement.

Islamic State Editorial 25 Years After the 9/11 Attacks

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Fri, 11 Sep 2026 15:55:49 GMT

Today marks 25 years since the 9/11 attacks in the U.S., which surely constitute a decisive turning point for any historian of jihadism. While the Islamic State releases its weekly al-Naba’ newsletter on Thursdays, the subject of this week’s editorial clearly has the 25th anniversary of the attacks in mind, even though it does not explicitly mention the attacks, which were the work of al-Qa‘ida, deemed by the Islamic State to be an ‘apostate’ organisation as the two groups are at war with each other in the Sahel region of Africa, for example.

Interview with a Rijal al-Karama Affiliate in al-Suwayda’

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Thu, 10 Sep 2026 12:29:15 GMT

In a recent post on X, U.S. envoy to Syria Tom Barrack spoke of American dismay about a ‘renewed escalation’ in the primarily Druze province of al-Suwayda’ in southern Syria, where security control remains split between Syrian government forces on the peripheries (mainly the northern and western countrysides) and local armed Druze groups, nominally united under the ‘National Guard’ endorsed by Suwayda’ Druze spiritual leader Hikmat al-Hijri.

For their part, pro-‘National Guard’ sources such as ‘Jethro Press’ have asserted that the government has tightened a siege on Suwayda’ in a bid to try to force the Druze population to submit. At the same time, some internal controversy has emerged over the effective deportation of a local critic of Hijri: Atef Hunaydi of the village of Majdal, who has since been made to relocate to Damascus.

While not all the Druze armed groups are wholly united in terms of endorsing Hijri’s notion of ‘Mount Bashan’ and the idea of complete separation from Syria and/or annexation by Israel, a rejectionist stance towards the Damascus government continues to predominate among them.

To discuss these issues and more, below is an interview conducted on 6 September with a media activist for Bayraq Saba' al-Jabal, an affiliate of the Rijal al-Karama Movement that was founded during the war by Wahid al-Bal‘ous (a Druze shaykh), who was assassinated in 2015 (likely by the Assad regime). Rijal al-Karama still asserts that it follows Wahid’s path, though his two sons Fahad and Layth are aligned with Damascus, with the latter currently serving as a member of the new Syrian parliament.

Q: Recently the 11th anniversary of the martyrdom of Shaykh Wahid al-Bal‘ous has passed. Of course the Rijal al-Karama Movement says it is still on his path, and in al-Suwayda’ today many people speak about the Mount Bashan project and separation from Syria. Do you think there is an inconsistency between Wahid al-Bal‘ous’ path and support for the Mount Bashan project today?

Syrian Turkmen Activist Complaints on Teaching of Turkish in Syrian Schools

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Mon, 07 Sep 2026 21:11:41 GMT

The question of instruction in the Kurdish language for Kurdish school-children has been a key issue as part of the integration of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian state. The end result of that integration process has been some concessions for limited instruction in Kurdish with Arabic remaining the dominant language of instruction even in Kurdish-majority areas.

But Kurds are not the only ethnic minority concerned about linguistic and cultural rights. Activist members of the Turkmen minority- primarily found in Latakia, Tartous, Aleppo (especially its northern countryside) and Homs provinces- have been keen to secure at least some instruction in the Turkish language.

The National Guard and Exams for Students in Suwayda’

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Wed, 02 Sep 2026 14:25:53 GMT

NB: Owing to family issues with the birth of a baby, I will not be posting as much as I normally do this month. A discount paid subscription rate remains this month. Alternatively, a donation of $50 or more to support paying licensing fees related to my next academic book project (payable here) will grant the donor a complementary annual subscription to this newsletter.

While local Druze armed groups under the ‘National Guard’ rubric retain security control of much of the predominantly Druze province of al-Suwayda’ in southern Syria, the government in Damascus still has leverage over the province because there is no formal international recognition of any purported autonomous structures backed by the National Guard. Thus, if students in al-Suwayda’ wish to attain accredited educational qualifications, they must go through the institutions that are controlled by Damascus.

One recent note of controversy on education has been the question of student exams. The central government recently invited students in al-Suwayda’ to take their exams in areas controlled by the government in the northern and western countryside of the province, where many originally Druze villages have become depopulated and were subject to destruction and looting by government forces during the July massacres in 2025. The National Guard, however, rejects the idea of allowing students to go to those exam centres, asserting that the government could not be trusted to provide safety and security for the students and accusing the government of using the exams issue as a form of pressure against the people of al-Suwayda’.

Amid the ongoing difficult living situation in the Druze areas of al-Suwayda’, reports that the National Guard prevented students from going to take their exams in government-controlled areas were not without controversy, although the National Guard itself portrayed the matter as widespread popular rejection of the government’s tactics and denied being the obstacle to the students’ movement. There has also been some wider controversy about recently broadcasted remarks of Suwayda’ Druze spiritual leader Hikmat al-Hijri (who endorses the National Guard project) portraying the Druze as an ‘indivisible’ part of Israel and sharing ‘creed’ with Israel.

To discuss some of these issues, below is a recent interview conducted on 29 August with a resident of Suwayda’.

According to a report today from the pro-Damascus ‘Suwayda 24’ outlet (which used to be fiercely critical of the government but has since been taken over by someone on the original admin team who is pro-government), ten students managed to go from National Guard-controlled areas to government-held areas to take their examinations.

Syrian Education Ministry Decree on Teaching Kurdish in Schools

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Mon, 31 Aug 2026 10:16:11 GMT

As part of the process of integrating the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and its Autonomous Administration (now officially declared ‘dissolved’) into the Syrian state, a key issue has been the question of Kurdish linguistic and cultural rights, including the right for Kurdish children to receive instruction in the Kurdish language. It is in this light that a new decree has been issued by the Education Ministry giving more specific instructions on the incorporation of Kurdish into the curricula. So what should one make of this decree?

Fundraising Appeal: Help Pay Licensing Fees for my Next Academic Book

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Thu, 27 Aug 2026 16:57:24 GMT

Dear Readers,

I am due to publish a translation and study of Lucas of Tuy’s ‘Chronicle of the World’ (Chronicon Mundi) with Routledge, constituting my third academic work after my translations and studies of the medieval Arabic work ‘The Conquest of al-Andalus’ and Rodrigo Ximénez de Rada’s ‘Minor Histories’. ‘Chronicle of the World’, composed in the thirteenth century CE, begins as a universal history and then effectively narrows down to a history of Spain. It constitutes one of the last major works of Latin-language medieval Iberian historiography prior to the transition towards vernacular historiography in the peninsula. It is also a useful source for topics such as Christian-Muslim relations in Spain, and depictions of Romans and Jews in medieval Iberian historiography.

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However, in order to proceed with publication, I have to pay licensing fees for use of the modern critical edition of the original Latin text of ‘Chronicle of the World’ (which was published by another company: Brepols).

As part of this effort at crowd fundraising I will be more than happy to mention contributors by name in the acknowledgements section at the beginning of the book. If you make a contribution of at least $50, I will also offer a complementary annual subscription to this newsletter, granting full access to the archive of my writings. Please inform me in writing if you do make such a contribution.

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