Aymenn’s Monstrous Publications

Iraqi Exile Nostalgia Culture: Poetry of Abbas Jijan

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Tue, 28 Jul 2026 20:17:25 GMT

While I was staying in Baghdad recently, it was striking to observe the contrast between the sense of security and normality that pervades the streets now and the situation around two decades ago in what can effectively be seen as the first of Iraq’s two post-2003 civil wars, a key component of which was essentially a battle for Baghdad between the U.S.-backed Shia-led government and allied armed Shia groups on one side, and Sunni insurgents on the other.

That war, of course, was won by the former side with the main consequence being that the capital was effectively secured and a notable demographic shift took place with Shia coming to constitute a much larger proportion of the city’s population. When the Islamic State seized large parts of the north and west of Iraq in 2014, marking the beginning of the second civil war (which the Iraqi government and its allies also won), there was some speculation among analysts that the group could somehow have taken Baghdad if it had focused its efforts on doing so, though that never struck me as a remotely realistic possibility.

𐌹t was during the period of the first civil war that one also saw a surge in what I would call the nostalgia culture among Iraqi exiles, giving rise to videos, songs and poetry expressing love for Iraq and contrasting the situation at the time with a rather idealised vision of Iraq’s past, often embodied in some nice photos from Iraq many decades ago. Two popular figures in this exile culture were the singer Hussam al-Rassam and the poet Abbas Jijan. For example, I remember some tracks that would combine segments of Jijan reciting poetry and Rassam singing Iraqi folk songs. On Youtube, you can also find videos of Jijan poetry being read by the poet himself and set to various Iraqi tunes, such as the theme soundtrack for the pre-2003 Iraqi TV series ‘Men of the Shadow’ by Iraqi Christian composer Raed George. But whereas Rassam is now one of Iraq’s best known modern singers, Jijan has generally slipped into obscurity.

The Campaign to Establish Jewish Settlements in Lebanon: Interview

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Sun, 26 Jul 2026 20:27:45 GMT

Previously, I have covered the ‘Pioneers of Bashan’ movement and their campaign to establish Jewish settlements in southern Syria. As a follow-up that I thought would be useful for readers and observers (in particular, the Lebanese newspaper L’Orient Le Jour recently asked me about the subject), I present an interview I recently conducted with Dr. Anna Sloutskin, who is a co-founder of the activist movement Uri Tzafon (also spelled Uri Tsafon in English, its name meaning ‘Awake, oh north [wind],’ a phrase taken from Song of Songs 4:16).

The movement seeks to establish Jewish settlements in Lebanon. In which parts of Lebanon is it seeking to establish Jewish settlements? What are its justifications? And how does the movement view the local Lebanese populations and the recent negotiations and agreements between the Lebanese and Israeli governments? Find out more in the exclusive interview below. Anna has also supplied a brief introduction to Uri Tsafon that I include by way of preface.

An emblem of the Uri Tzafon movement.

The Grave of Hisham al-Hashimi in Najaf

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Wed, 22 Jul 2026 17:33:40 GMT

Readers who follow Iraqi politics and/or jihadist groups will probably remember the figure of Hisham al-Hashimi, who was widely quoted in foreign and local media outlets as a leading expert on the Islamic State. In fact, this month marked the sixth anniversary of his assassination in Baghdad.

Although a Shi‘i convert to Sunni Islam, Hashimi’s grave is to be found in the massive Wadi al-Salam cemetery in Najaf that is most commonly associated with burial of Shi‘a. I was able to visit it during a night trip to the cemetery. Perhaps somewhat ironically, his grave is located not too far from one of the cemeteries belonging to the pro-Iranian armed group Kata’ib Hezbollah, which I also visited and documented in a previous post.

'Iraq’s voice: the martyr al-Hashimi'- a poster near his grave in Wadi al-Salam.

The 'Martyrs' Cemetery of Kata'ib Hezbollah in Najaf (I)

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Fri, 17 Jul 2026 21:25:33 GMT

The area of Wadi al-Salam (‘Valley of Peace’) in Iraq’s holy Shia city of Najaf is popularly considered to be the world’s largest cemetery. Besides the huge number of civilians buried there, a number of Iraq’s armed Shia factions also maintain special sections devoted to their ‘martyrs’- members of these factions killed in various military campaigns.

The section maintained by Kata’ib Hezbollah- one of the factions ideologically aligned with Iran- is one of the more impressive examples. The following post documents part of the ‘martyrs’ cemetery maintained by the group in Najaf, based on photos I took of the tombs. The cemetery itself that is accessible to visitors is divided into two main halls. This post- the first of a series- covers a portion of the ‘martyrs’ contained in the first hall, where the total number of ‘martyrs’ runs into the hundreds. While most of the ‘martyrs’ in the hall were killed in Kata’ib Hezbollah’s military campaigns in Iraq as part of the war against the Islamic State, a number were also killed fighting in Syria in support of the Assad regime against the insurgency and the Islamic State.

The ‘martyrdom’ records provide a very useful historical record regarding Kata’ib Hezbollah’s military operations.

For each entry, where applicable, the name of the ‘martyr’, date of ‘martyrdom’ and place of ‘martyrdom’ will be provided.

Ammar Abd al-Husayn al-Abudi
20 February 2021
Jurf al-Nasr [Jurf al-Sakhr, located south of Baghdad and home to a Kata’ib Hezbollah base and operations command].

Harakat Rijal al-Karama Statement One Year After the Suwayda' Massacres

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Tue, 14 Jul 2026 21:51:06 GMT

It has been around a year since Syrian government forces and allied tribal militiamen entered the primarily Druze province of al-Suwayda’ in southern Syria, ostensibly serving as a ‘mediation’ force but in fact seeking to impose government security control and dismantle the Druze armed groups in the province that were largely responsible for security. The government campaign saw massacres and other violations committed against the Druze community, with violations being committed on a much smaller scale by Druze armed groups against Bedouins who left the province.

Understandably, the anniversary of the massacres has seen commemorations in remembrance of the victims among Druze communities in the region and in the West. In some cases, grief over the massacres has spilled into denunciations of the Syrian government: most notably in the Damascus suburb of Jaramana that contains a large Druze population and was brought under government control in May of last year. The controversy over the denunciations and reported declarations of support for Suwayda’ Druze religious leader Hikmat al-Hijri and the ‘Mount Bashan’ separatist project prompted the Druze Jaramana Waqf Committee to issue a clarification statement, stating that the authorities had granted permission for demonstrations in remembrance of the victims of the massacres but then ‘some youth’ took the opportunity to express ‘rejected chants that do not express the stance of the people of the town of Jaramana or their values.’ The statement (see below) affirmed support for ‘a one unified Syria in all its sects, and the town of Jaramana is an authentic part of Ghouta in Damascus, and its orientation is Damascus, and its people are partners in building one unified Syrian homeland.’ This positioning by Druze religious authorities in Jaramana is unsurprising, considering that Jaramana’s Druze population constitutes an isolated community and is at the mercy of the government authorities.

As for the Druze of Suwayda’, the predominant public stance remains one of open rejection towards the government, which is seen as not having done much beyond symbolic measures for accountability (e.g. the recent sessions for public trial of a limited number of defendants, whose names and images are not publicised in media) and having sought to deflect from accountability by focusing on portraying Hikmat al-Hijri and his supporters as the real villains.

However, a rejectionist stance towards the government does not mean total unity of position and opinion in Suwayda’.

Internal Tensions Among Uzbek 'Migrants' in Syria

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Sun, 12 Jul 2026 21:57:34 GMT

In May, tensions between some of the independent Uzbek ‘muhajirin’ (‘migrants’) and the Syrian government came to the forefront, with claims that the government was supposedly targeting independent ‘muhajirin’ for arrest on grounds of Islamic State links while calling on ‘muhajirin’ to merge into the forces of the Ministry of Defence. Some two months later, the tensions persist and only reinforce the earlier point about internal divisions between ‘muhajirin’ who are more closely aligned with the government and those who take a more ‘independent’ line, illustrating that ‘muhajirin’ as a whole are not an ideological or organisational monolith.

This is reflected in two new statements put out by different groups of Uzbek ‘muhajirin.’

The Baghdad-Mosul Route and Hashd Groups: An Observational Trip

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Sat, 11 Jul 2026 19:09:18 GMT

In Iraq, there has been much talk in recent months about armed factions disarming and confining arms in the hands of proper state institutions and forces, partly as a result of greater American pressure on Iraq’s government to crack down on Iranian influence.

In a recent interview with al-Jazeera, government spokesman Haydar al-Aboudi tied the calls to disarmament with the withdrawal of the international coalition against the Islamic State that is set to be completed by 30 September, asserting that the ‘reasons for bearing arms that were required by the circumstances of 2014’ are no longer applicable to today (this issue will be discussed further below). When asked which factions have actually handed over their weapons until now, al-Aboudi asserted that Saraya al-Salam (Muqtada al-Sadr’s group deployed in the Samarra area), Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq have some other unspecified groups have done so. Further, in response to a question about those who refuse to hand over weapons, al-Aboudi asserted: ‘All understand this responsibility.’

But the reality is more complex than al-Aboudi would suggest.

Islamic State Kinetic Activity in First Half of 2026

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Mon, 06 Jul 2026 17:49:44 GMT

The following infographic, provided by the Islamic State’s ‘Amaq News Agency’, gives an overview of the group’s kinetic activity around the world for the first half of 2026. It divides kinetic activity into types of attacks, lists the number of various objects that have been destroyed, seized or burned by the Islamic State (including burning of churches- reflecting the group’s targeted persecution of Christians in parts of Africa), and a list of countries where the group has committed attacks, identifying the number of operations and the resulting casualties among the group’s enemies.

Syrian Shia Killed Fighting Israel on the Golan Border?

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Sun, 05 Jul 2026 14:43:43 GMT

Recently, numerous social media posts- primarily those emanating from pro-‘resistance axis’ accounts and channels- claimed that two Syrian Shia individuals were killed fighting Israeli forces near the borders with the Golan Heights. Is there any truth to these claims? Find out more in the investigation below based on open-source research and interviewing sources.

Islamic State Editorial on the New Syrian Parliament

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Sat, 04 Jul 2026 13:49:04 GMT

Following a system of election by select committees (rather than a genuine popular vote) and personal selection by President Ahmad al-Sharaa, the new Syrian parliament, comprising 210 members, has now been filled. Among the parliament members selected by Sharaa himself, observers have noted in particular the case of actress Ruzayna al-Ladhqani, whose glamorous, secular image contrasts with the popular conception of the new Syria as an Islamist-run order.

However, it is not yet clear how much of a role parliament will have in legislation in contrast with the tendency towards rule by presidential decree during the transition period. Further, in general, the parliament’s members do not reflect competing political parties, which fits in with the nature of the existing order: that is, an order in which there are no rival political projects to that of Ahmad al-Sharaa and his closest associates.

The Destruction of the Shia Village of Mazra'a in Homs

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Thu, 02 Jul 2026 13:33:14 GMT

In previous posts, I have noted that the Twelver Shia of Homs province have generally had a worse experience of the post-Assad period than their brethren in the villages of Nubl and al-Zahara’ in Aleppo province. with many of the Shia of Homs currently displaced in Lebanon and having lost homes and property that were confiscated by government supporters. The government’s recent erasure of the Homs Shia village of Mazra‘a, located west of Homs city, is the latest example of problems faced by the Shia in Homs.

The Israeli Incursions into 'Abidin in the Yarmouk Basin of Southern Syria: Interview

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Mon, 29 Jun 2026 23:06:38 GMT

In the region of the Yarmouk Basin that is located in western Deraa countryside on the border with the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights, Israeli forces continue to maintain a presence and recently clashed with locals of the Yarmouk Basin village of ‘Abidin. According to Deraa 24, the tensions began when Israeli forces established an outpost on a hill west of ‘Abidin where the old regime army’s 112th brigade was stationed and then entered into the village and set up a checkpoint on the road leading to the village of Jamla (also in the Yarmouk Basin and south of ‘Abidin). This gave rise to clashes between the Israeli forces and locals. Subsequently, Israeli aircraft bombed the periphery of the village of ‘Abidin, only for Israeli forces to subsequently withdraw from the position set up west of the village.

The incident attracted condemnation of Israeli forces’ conduct by Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as well as expressions of solidarity with ‘Abidin on the local populist level. For instance, Layth al-Balous, a Druze shaykh known for his pro-government stance, praised the people of ‘Abidin for embodying the ‘spirit of belonging, dignity and adherence to the land’, and commending the people of Deraa as the ‘shield of the homeland’ proving that southern Syria remains an ‘authentic part of Syria’s identity and history.’

Although some might suggest that the clashes in ‘Abidin reflect a supposed attempt by Iran and the ‘resistance axis’ to stir up trouble, the more likely explanation for what happened is that the Israeli presence is understandably seen by many locals as an occupation that should be resisted when it is seen as transgressing certain limits, even if there is a general preference in Syria for the government to pursue negotiations with the Israelis to remove them from the areas of Deraa and Qunaytra governorates they have moved into.

What follows is an interview I conducted with a beekeeper from ‘Abidin on 13 December 2025 about the nature of the Israeli presence in the area. The observations made at the time still remain valid now and provide useful context.

Graphic shared by Layth al-Balous commemorating resistance by people from ‘Abidin to the Israeli forces’ presence (which took the form of stone-throwing by some locals): ‘One people, one homeland, the new Syria. Our dignity is from the dignity of our land.’

Q: Are Israeli forces infiltrating into ‘Abidin, or they have not infiltrated for some time?

Controversy over Restrictions Issued by Syria's Ministry of Information

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Sat, 27 Jun 2026 15:53:33 GMT

Although Syria’s Ministry of Information has celebrated advances in the country’s press freedom rankings, these advances are primarily due to the end of the civil war and the fact that the benchmark set by the Assad regime was so low. While the ministry claims to support an efficient and transparent process of issuing permits for foreign journalists, the reality tells a story of delays and stonewalling when the ministry has issues with critical press coverage.

The ministry has recently become embroiled in further controversy with a new video it issued on "six prohibited things." This announcement was done via video. I provide the full translation below:

'Ashura in the Syrian Shia Villages of Nubl and al-Zahara'

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Sat, 27 Jun 2026 11:29:52 GMT

‘Ashura falls on 10 Muharram in an Islamic calendar year (this year from evening of 24 June until evening of 25 June) and is considered an occasion of mourning in Shia Islam because it is considered to have been the day when al-Husayn bin ‘Ali, the third Shia imam and grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, was killed at the battle of Karbala’ in 680 CE. Practices associated with ‘Ashura take place in the ten days leading up to 10 Muharram and generally continue through to the day following ‘Ashura. This year, what has the occasion and the build-up to it been like for some Syrian Shia communities?

The Iran-Israel War: A Perspective from Iran

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Tue, 23 Jun 2026 10:08:56 GMT

As a companion to my previous interview with an analyst based in Israel regarding the recent U.S. and Israeli war against Iran and the subsequent ‘memorandum of understanding’ (MoU) between the U.S. and Iran, I present this interview with a contact who resides in the Iranian city of Qom (known as a centre of religious learning). He has resided in Iran since 2012, having originally come there from Syria, and I have known him for many years.

Of course, I cannot claim to know what exact proportion of Iranians are represented by the perspectives given here, but it is clear to me that there is, at minimum, a substantial minority of Iranians who remain committed to the Islamic Republic as an ideological project, and if anything they feel emboldened by what they see as the Islamic Republic’s success in holding out against the U.S. and Israel.

Q: You used to be critical of the Iranian government’s policies before the war. But in this war, you stood with the government. How did you view what Israel and America were doing? Did you think they would bring about regime change?

The Iran-Israel War: A Perspective from Israel

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Sat, 20 Jun 2026 12:12:30 GMT

At present, discussion of the war that began following the American and Israeli attack on Iran at the end of February this year is focused on the ‘memorandum of understanding’ (MoU), which, in multiple respects, reflects concessions to Iran. For example, Article 2 affirms a commitment by both the U.S. and Iran to refrain from interfering in each other’s affairs- a far cry from Donald Trump’s professed commitment to aid Iranians protesting against their government in January. Similarly, Article 6 outlines an American commitment to develop a funding plan of $300 billion in reconstruction for Iran, and Article 7 features a commitment to lift all sanctions on Iran as part of a final deal. It is not clear that all the terms can be implemented, but there is no doubt that the U.S.-Israeli war effort to bring about regime change can be considered a failure.

What has the experience of the war and its aftermath been like for people living in Israel? I present below an interview with an analyst from Israel I know who lives in the greater Tel Aviv area and is focused on the energy sector in a certain Middle Eastern country (for this reason, he prefers to remain anonymous). While the interview primarily focuses on the experience of the war with Iran and its aftermath, there is also discussion of the growing issue of concern about Jewish settler terrorism against Palestinians in the West Bank (which has even raised alarm among some Israeli settlers, as will be seen below). The interview is slightly edited and condensed for clarity to take into account how events developed over time. A subsequent companion interview will be presented with a person living in Iran to give a perspective from the other side.

A protestor against Trump and the MoU with Iran in Jerusalem on 19 June 2026: “Trump, don’t catch a free ride at our expense” (i.e. do no exploit us). Photo supplied by the interviewee.

Did people in Israel think the war was one of necessity and was there real optimism it could bring the fall of the regime?

Islamic State Editorial on the 2026 World Cup

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Thu, 18 Jun 2026 19:53:25 GMT

Predictably, the Islamic State has used the opportunity of global attention on the 2026 World Cup to release an editorial on the event. Unsurprisingly, the Islamic State is hostile to the event (deemed the ‘scum cup’) given that it features the football teams of nation-states (a concept opposed by the Islamic State) playing against each other. The main points of the editorial are as follows:

The Destroyed Archaeological Site of Ayn Dara in Afrin

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Tue, 16 Jun 2026 21:40:04 GMT

Destruction and plundering of Syria’s archaeological heritage during the war have most popularly been associated with the Islamic State and its intentional demolition of archaeological sites in Palmyra perceived as ‘idolatrous’ as well as the familiar talking point about antiquities smuggling having served as a source of revenue for the group. But in fact, most parties in Syria’s civil war have been guilty of damaging and looting at least some of Syria’s archaeological heritage. The site of Ayn Dara, located to the south of Afrin town, is a case-in-point involving Turkey and the Turkish-backed armed groups of the ‘Syrian National Army’ (SNA), which seized the area from the Kurdish-led YPG in 2018.

The Parrochiale Suevum: Ecclesiastical Divisions in Northwest Iberia

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Mon, 15 Jun 2026 22:36:28 GMT

In an earlier post examining the Chronicon Iriense, it was noted how appealing to pre-Islamic conquest Iberian history could serve propagandistic purposes for churches in the peninsula in the medieval period as they sought to delineate their territory and authority. The Chronicon Iriense did so for the church of Santiago de Compostela by tying the origins of its predecessor church- Iria Flavia- to a settlement founded by a runaway Trojan princess and an endowment by Miro/Mirus, a king of the Suevi, a Germanic people who ruled the northwest of the Iberian peninsula encompassing parts of modern-day Spain and Portugal during the fifth and sixth centuries CE. Their realm was subsequently subjugated by the Visigoths.

The Parrochiale Suevum (‘Parish Division of the Suevi’) is a similar document of interest. It purports to represent an ecclesiastical division of the region of the Galicia (located in the northwest of the peninsula, more extensive here than the modern autonomous community of Galicia in Spain) during the rule of the Suevic king Theodemir, who, according to Isidore of Seville, restored the Suevi to the Catholic faith after a period in which the Suevi had fallen into the error of Arianism, which is deemed a Christian heresy for positing the Son is not co-eternal with the Father but rather was created at a point in time and was lesser than the Father. Theodemir was also Miro’s predecessor, according to Isidore. The purported division is dated to 569 CE, and divides the territory of Galicia into 13 dioceses encompassing more than 100 parishes. Since the purported division took place during the reign of Theodemir, the text is also referred to by scholars as the ‘Division of Theodemir.’

While it cannot be definitively ruled out that the document (of which there are six copies) could partially reflect an actual ecclesiastical division during Suevic rule in the sixth century CE, it is reasonable to suspect that there has been interpolation in certain parts by forgers seeking to stake out territorial claims for their churches in later centuries.

The most evident case of manipulations pertains to the church of Lugo (located in modern northwest Spain), which contains one of the six existing versions of this document. Fernando López Alsina suggests three manipulations here.

First, the names of many parishes affiliated with Lugo are omitted, with the document instead specifying that Lugo should possess adjacent areas ‘held by 11 counts.’ It is likely that this specification is tied to the diocese of Lugo’s claim to have ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the territory surrounding Lugo during the 11th century CE, at a time when at least part of this territory was being administered by other sees like Oviedo. If the restored sees of Tuy, Ourense and Braga received episcopal jurisdiction over their surrounding territories in their dioceses, the same principle should apply to Lugo.

Second, the territory of Asturias is attributed to Bretoña. Bretoña’s name points to a migration of people from Britain to the northwest coast of Iberia, and in ecclesiastical terms Bretoña was originally a personal rather than territorial jurisdiction. Bretoña’s episcopal successor was Mondoñedo. By assigning ‘Asturias’ as its territorial jurisdiction, the manipulation puts Mondoñedo at odds with Oviedo, asserts Lugo’s claims to authority over territory within Mondoñedo’s diocese, and rejected Oviedo’s right to assert jurisdiction over churches Lugo asserted were under its authority in accordance with the sixth century CE. In short, Lugo’s ecclesiastical jurisdiction would extend to the Cantabrian coast.

Third, the list of parishes for Iria includes four that are not attested in the sixth century CE: Prucios, Besancos, Trasancos and Lapaciencos, which constituted four ‘arch-priesthoods’ (groups of small parishes under an archpriest) at the end of the 11th century CE and are located in the far north of what is now A Coruña province in Spain. By assigning the four locales to Iria, the text would arguably have been well received by Santiago de Compostela, which contested these locales and others with Mondoñedo. All that said, it should be noted that the existing copy of this text found at Lugo does not contain these various extra localities for Iria. Rather, they are found in four other existing versions of the text: namely, Ourense, Santiago de Compostela, Coímbra and one of the two versions at Braga.

Below is my translation of the Latin text per the edition provided by Alsina in his study, which he deems to be the version that was promulgated by the church of Lugo during the tenure of Bishop Vistruario in the latter half of the 11th century CE. For a full list of the locales listed in the six existing versions of the text, see this study in 2020 by Renzi and Mariani.

The cathedral at Lugo in northwest Spain

Parrochiale Suevum

In antiquity, the number of dioceses that each see was prescribed to have

In the time of the Suevi, on the Kalends of January in era 607, the Suevi’s ruler Theodemir ordered a council to be convened in the city of Lugo in order to affirm the Catholic faith and discuss various church matters. After they dealt with whatever came up in the council, the king sent his letter to the bishops who had been assembled there. The letter contained these words: ‘I desire, most holy fathers, that you should make a decision regarding our province with a prudent view as to what is beneficial. For in the entire region of Galicia that is quite vast, the dioceses are held by a few bishops, such that some churches can hardly be visited by their bishop each year. In addition, there is only one metropolitan bishop in charge of such a great province, such that it is wearisome for the remotest parishes to convene for the council each year.’ When the bishops read this letter, they decided in a synod that the see of Lugo should be a metropolitan one just like the see of Braga, because there was the boundary for neighbouring bishops, and because there was always a great gathering of the Suevi at the locality of Lugo. In addition, in that council they chose other sees for ordination of bishops. And thus through each cathedral they divided the dioceses and parishes lest there should be any dispute between the bishops. The division was as follows:

1. To the cathedral of Braga belong these churches that neighbour it:

- Centumcellas
- Coetos
- Lemeto
- Anoaste
- Milia
- Ciliolis
- Ad portum
- Agilio

- Carandonis
- Tauvis
- Ciliotao
- Cetanio
- Oculis
- Cerecis
- Petroneto
- Equesis
- Ad saltum

. Also these villages:

- Pannonias
- Laetera
- Brigantia
- Astiatico
- Tureco
- Auneco
- Merobrio
- Berese
- Palantucio
- Celo
- Supelegio

- Senequio

30 churches in total

2. To the see of Porto, in the new fort, belong these churches that neighbour it:

- Villanova
- Betaonia
- Visea
- Menturio
- Torebria
- Bauvaste
- Bonzoaste
- Lumbo
- Nescis
- Napoli
- Curmiano
- Magneto
- Leporeto
- Melga
- Tongobria
- Villa Gomedei
- Tauvasse

Also these villages:

- Labrencio
- Aliobrio
- Valle Aritia
- Truculo
- Cepis
- Mandolas
- Palentiaca

25 churches in total

3. To the see of Lamego: Lamego itself, plus:

- Tuentica
- Aravoca
- Cantabriano
- Omina
- Camianos

Six churches in total

4. To the see of Coimbra, Coimbra itself, plus:

- Eminio
- Selio
- Lurbine
- Insula
- Antunane
- Old fort of Porto

Seven churches in total

5. To the see of Viseo, Viseo itself, plus:

- Rodomiro
- Submontio
- Suverbeno
- Osania
- Ovellione
- Tutela
- Coleia
- Caliabrica, which was subsequently a see for the Goths.

Nine churches in total

6. For Dumio, the family of servants.

7. For the see of Egitania, all of Egitania, plus:

- Municipio
- Francos

Three churches in total

8. For the see of Lugo, the city of Lugo and its adjacent areas which are held by 11 counts, together with:

- Carioca
- Sevios
- Cavarcos

9. For the see of Ourense:

- Palla Aurea
- Verugio

- Bibalos
- Teporos
- Geurros
- Pincia
- Cassavio
- Verecanos
- Senabria
- Calapacios Maiores

11 churches in total.

10. For the see of Astorga, Astorga itself, plus:

- León.
- Bergido

- Petra Speranti
- Conianca

- Ventosa
- Maurelos Superiores and Inferiores
- Senimure
- Fraucelos
- Pesicos

10 churches in total.

11. For the seat of Iria, Iria itself, plus:

- Morracio

- Salinense

- Contenos

- Celenos

- Metacios

- Mercienses

- Pestemarcos
- Coporos
- Celticos
- Bregantinos
- Prutenos
- Prucios
- Besancos
- Trasancos
- Lapaciencos
- Arros

12. To the see of Tuy, the churches that neighbour it:

- Turedo

- Tabulela

- Lucoparre

- Aureas

- Langetude

- Carisiano

- Marciliana

- Turonio

- Celesantes

- Toruca

Also these villages:

- Aunone

- Sacria

- Erbilione

- Cauda

- Ovinia

- Cartas

17 churches in total.

13. To the see of Britoña belong the churches that are among the Britons, together with the monastery of Máximo and Asturias.

The New Syrian Currency: Observations on the Ground

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Thu, 11 Jun 2026 11:14:09 GMT

𐌹t has now been six months or so since the Syrian government introduced a new version of the Syrian pound: essentially a re-domination of the currency under the Assad regime that removes two zeros. For example, 5000 old Syrian pounds (the highest monetary note under the old regime, featuring on one side a Syrian soldier saluting next to the old Syrian flag) would equal 50 Syrian pounds under the new currency. Meanwhile, the highest monetary note under the new government is 500 Syrian pounds, equivalent to 50000 Syrian pounds under the old regime.

But what do transactions look like on the ground? Moreover, has the re-denomination led to any improvement in people’s daily lives?